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“Education is the most powerful weapon
which you can use to change the world”.
Nelson Mandela
This thesis includes three essays on topics related to human capital, particularly that attained
through education. Chapter 1 considers the human capital as an important factor which determines
the allocation of decision rights within the firm. The last two chapters carry out an empirical analysis
on the link between institutions, governance and education. Each chapter can be considered indepen-
dently of the rest.
The first chapter is aimed at the enterprise level. Chapter 1 examines empirically the determinants of
delegation of decision-making in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). An important contribution
of this chapter is that existing literature focuses on large firms. Instead, the research study of this chapter
focuses on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), that is, firms with less than 250 employees. Using
a unique dataset on Spanish SMEs that includes information on the hierarchical level of the person
making decisions on a number of firm issues, the results show that the determinants of decentralization
in SMEs are not necessarily the same than for larger firms. The delegation of decision rights to basic
workers or a team of workers is positively correlated to firm characteristics such as the use of internal
networks, the number of workplaces or the firm’s export intensity. However, unlike previous studies for
larger firms, firm size is found not to matter. The allocation of authority is also related to the composition
of the firm’s labor force; in particular, to the average education of workers and, importantly, to their
distribution as well.1
Chapter 2 using a panel of countries covering the period 1970-2004, looks at the contribution of
political leaders to enhance citizens education and investigates how the educational attainment of the
1This chapter was supervised by Prof. Susana Iranzo.
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population is affected while a leader with higher education remains in office. For this purpose, the
empirical analysis considers educational transitions of political leaders in office defined as the change in
the educational level of political leader from one mandate to other. The research findings show that the
educational attainment of population increases when a more educated leader remains in office. Moreover,
the educational attainment of the population is negatively impacted when a country transitions from
an educated leader to a less educated one. These results are a plausible explanation for the effect of
leader’s education on economic growth found in the previous literature. Also, the empirical analysis
contributes to the literature by providing further evidence in the scant but emerging literature that links
leaders’ characteristics with countries’ performance. Altogether, results suggest that the socio-economic
background of political leaders may be informative about the type of policies they can be more sensitive.
Therefore, this claims for the convenience of the use of “open lists” in democratic countries, where voters
can decide not only about the party in the government but also about the individuals in each list.
Finally, Chapter 3 analyzes the impact of duration of primary education on school enrollment,
graduation and drop-outs rates. The empirical analysis draws upon a panel data for non-OECD countries
covering the period 1970-2012. The results show that for children in elementary school one additional
grade of primary education have a negative impact on the enrollment rate, while the effect on drop-
outs is positive. Analogously, it is obtained that an additional grade in primary education reduces the
enrollment rate in secondary education. These results are in line with the fertility model approach,
that is, in developing and underdeveloped countries parents do not have incentive to send children to
school given the high perceived economic value of children. Thus, an increase in duration of primary
education discourages their continuation in the education system. Although previous literature provides
evidence that increasing compulsory schooling in developed countries have positive returns in terms
of earnings and non-pecuniary outcomes (school externalities), this may not apply for developing and
underdeveloped countries where children earnings are one component of the household income and in
many cases represent the support of the entire family. Therefore, policies consisting in lasting the
duration of primary education, which have been proved to be successful in developed countries, may
fail in developing and underdeveloped countries since it might have an undesired impact on children
educational outcomes (enrollment, graduation or drop-outs).2
2Chapters 2 and 3 were supervised by Prof. Luis Dı́az-Serrano.
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Delegation of Decisions in Small Firms: Some Empirical Evidence from
Spanish SMEs.
1.1 Introduction
The decentralization or delegation of decisions within the firm is an important issue because the
allocation of decision rights and other organizational aspects of the firm are related to several
indicators of firm performance. For instance, Kastl et al. (2013) find a positive relation between
delegation and firm R&D activity and Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) obtain a positive effect of or-
ganizational changes (including the decentralization of authority) on firm productivity. Similarly,
Cooke (1994) and Boning et al. (2007) stress the relationship between the firm’s organizational de-
sign and productivity, whereas Ichniowski (1990) and Osterman (2006) highlight the relationship
with financial results and wages, respectively.
By decentralization of decisions we mean the delegation of decision rights from the owner or
manager (the principal, hereafter) to the plant supervisor and/or floor workers (the agent, here-
after) who potentially possess more information about the specific matters of the firm. However,
the interests of the principal and the agent might not be aligned, and the agent can use his or
her informational advantage to make choices that are not in the best interest of the principal.
A large theoretical literature has analyzed this trade-off between the benefits and the costs of
decentralization.
1
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In recent years some efforts have also been made to empirically test the theories concerning
delegation of authority. For example, using a survey of Italian manufacturing firms, Colombo and
Delmastro (2004) investigate the relationship between the allocation of decision-making authority
and internal aspects of the firm’s organizational structure. Acemoglu et al. (2007) study decen-
tralization on a dataset on British and French firms and emphasize an establishment’s distance
to the technological frontier, as well as firm age and the heterogeneity in which the firm operates
as determinants of decentralization. Bloom et al. (2012) find that product-market competition
and trust are associated with decentralization while the religious preferences of a region can be
associated with centralization. Similarly, Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) find that product market
competition has an effect on the number of layers between division managers and the Chief Ex-
ecutive Officers (CEO). Wait and Meagher (2008) model the allocation of decision making rights
between a principal and an agent when there are multiple decisions to be made and empirically
find that delegation is more likely the more competitive the product market is and also in the
case of exporting firms. All these works focus on large firms though. Instead, in this paper we
focus on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), that is, firms with less than 250 employees,
which is an important contribution of the paper.
SMEs play a key role in many economies like Spain and other southern European countries.
Just to have an idea of their economic importance, as of 2011, 99.88% of Spanish firms were
SMEs and they employed about 60% of the total workforce. In the Spanish region we look at in
this paper, Catalonia, SMEs represent 99.86% of total businesses and contribute to 51.3% of the
region gross value added. SMEs have certain particularities that make them different from larger
firms. One such aspect is the ownership structure; many of them are family businesses (that is,
the majority of the voting securities are held by a single family) which has clear implications
for the hierarchical organization and the allocation of decision rights within the firm. Moreover,
given their reduced size they naturally tend to have fewer hierarchical layers and the information
from bottom workers (and customers) to supervisors and managers can flow more easily than in
larger firms. A priori, all these factors would make us expect higher levels of centralization of
decisions among SMEs and thus it is not obvious what factors, if any, would lead to the delegation
of decision making in small and medium-sized firms.
We use the existing theoretical predictions and empirical findings concerning the delegation
of decision rights within large firms as a guideline to empirically explore the determinants of
decentralization in small and medium-sized firms. To that aim, we use a unique database that
2
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provides detailed information on the allocation of a number of decision rights for a sample of
over 300 manufacturing SMEs in the Spanish region of Catalonia. As the dataset contains rich
information not only on the firms but also on a sample of their workers, in addition to the firm
characteristics commonly stressed in the literature, we can consider workers characteristics that
previous empirical works did not include. For example, we investigate the role of workers skills
and the distribution of workers skills as possible determinants of decentralization within the firm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the empirical and theoretical
literature about the determinants of decentralization. Section 1.3 describes the dataset. In
Section 1.4 the econometric model is specified and main results are presented. Finally, Section 1.5
concludes.
1.2 Determinants of Decentralization within the Firm: A Literature
Review
As said above the principal-agent problem lies at the heart of the decentralization problem and
there is a rich stream of theoretical papers analyzing the issue within this framework.1 For
instance, Aghion and Tirole (1997) show that the optimal transfer of decision authority to the
agent depends positively on the information advantage he or she enjoys with respect to the
principal and the extent of the private benefits he or she can extract from exercising decision-
making power. If the agent’s private benefits are large, delegation may increase both the agent’s
initiative to acquire information and his or her participation in the contractual relationship.
Similarly, Laffont and Martimort (1998) argue that decentralization emerges whenever limits of
communication and collusive behavior among agents are taken into account. That is, the trade-
off between the superior knowledge of the agent and the agency costs of managerial delegation
determines the optimal degree of decentralization or, in other words, the determinants governing
the decision to delegate authority depend on the costs and benefits it implies. Among the benefits
1There exists another important strand of literature on decentralization that ignores the problem of conflicting
objectives between the principal and the agent and, instead, emphasizes the issue of coordination of imperfectly
informed actors –see for example, Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991),Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), Aghion and
Tirole (1997), Garicano (2000), Hart and Moore (2005) and Alonso et al. (2008). These papers also highlight the
fact that hierarchical organizations that centralize the decision-making tend to have organization failures due to
information transmission leaks (Keren and Levhari, 1983, 1989) and delays in transmitting information from the
top to the bottom of the hierarchy (Radner, 1993; Van Zandt, 1999).
3
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of decentralization we have the following: i) it reduces the costs of information transfer and
communication because the information is processed at the level at which it is used (Caroli and
Van Reenen, 2001); ii) it increases the agent’s initiative and participation (Aghion and Tirole,
1997) and so it may increase productivity through increased involvement of lower level staff and
higher job satisfaction (Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001); iii) it allows full exploitation of agent’s
competencies as it fosters task specialization (Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994; Geanakoplos and
Milgrom, 1991); iv) it increases the response of firms to market changes and v) it reduces delays
because it allows tasks to be performed concurrently.
On the other hand, decentralization entails some costs : i) as it is natural in a context of
asymmetric information, there is a control cost; that is, agents are tempted to hide valuable
information in order to achieve their own objectives that generally are not congruent with those
of their superior (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Poitevin, 2000; Wait and Meagher, 2008; Christie
et al., 2003); ii) there tends to be duplication of information between hierarchical levels (Greenan
and Guellec, 1994; Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001); iii) it might increase the risk of errors because
specialized monitoring disappears and there are less direct controls over the production process;
iv) it might lead to increased stress of workers due to the greater responsibility they face; v) as
decentralization leads to skill upgrading, it might also lead to increased wage inequality (Aghion
et al., 1999).
Some of the costs and benefits of decentralization are related to internal aspects of the firm
(for example, the ease with which information flows between hierarchical levels or the skills of the
workforce) while others have to do with external factors (market conditions or uncertain demand).
We use the classification between internal and external factors as guidance to our empirical work
and try to identify the determinants that affect the delegation of decisions in practice.
1.2.1 Internal Factors
Among the factors intrinsic to the firm that might affect the allocation of decision rights, the
theoretical and empirical literatures have emphasized the following: firm size and the firm or-
ganizational structure, the use of communication technologies, firm human capital, firm age and
the use of pay incentives.
Firm size might difficult the flow of information within the firm and makes local knowledge
important (Colombo and Delmastro, 2004). In effect, a larger size might lead to information
overload within the firm, which increases the principal’s marginal disutility of getting informed and
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presses him to delegate decision-making power to the agent who is closer to the firm’s operations.
As for the firm organizational structure, the organization in several plants requires greater
coordination among them, which encourages the centralization of decision making.2 However,
the physical distance between the agent and the principal is also greater if the plant belongs
to a multi-unit firm, and this can have two opposite effects. First, a greater physical distance
reinforces the informational advantage on local issues enjoyed by the agent and makes communi-
cation with the principal more difficult, which favors decentralization. Second, it becomes harder
for the principal to monitor the decisions taken by the agent which, in the absence of effective
incentive systems, would lead to greater centralization. Thus, it has an ambiguous effect on de-
centralization. Likewise, the communication technologies used by the firm might either centralize
or decentralize the decision-making process (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006). On the one
hand, the decentralization disadvantage of losing control is reduced as advanced communication
technologies allow the principal to monitor the agent and to be informed. On the other hand,
they can also reduce the disadvantages of centralization by speeding up the transmission of in-
formation from the top to the bottom of the hierarchy.3 Therefore, the effect of communication
technologies is ambiguous too.
The firm human capital is another important factor because decentralization requires higher
levels of human capital of workers in order to deal with increased responsibility and uncertainty.
Other arguments supporting this idea are the fact that skilled workers are more autonomous
and less likely to make mistakes, they are better at communicating which reduces the risk of
duplicating information and they are more able to analyze new pieces of knowledge so that the
benefits of local information processing are enhanced (Caroli et al., 2001). We go one step further
and consider not only the firm average human capital but also the dispersion of skills among the
labor force. In effect, although neglected in the literature on the allocation of decision rights,
some studies analyzing firm productivity such as Iranzo et al. (2008); Ilmakunnas and Maliranta
(2005); Hellerstein et al. (1999) have looked at the composition of the labor force and found that
it does also matter.
Firm age is generally included as a control variable without a clear theoretical prediction.
Acemoglu et al. (2007), for instance, find that, on average, younger firms tend to be more decen-
2The use of yardstick competition, though, may increase the ability of the company’s headquarters to decen-
tralize decision-making (Colombo and Delmastro, 2004).
3Keren and Levhari (1979); Keren and Levhari (1983), Radner (1993) and Aghion and Tirole (1997) consider
that the use of advanced communication technologies reinforces the trend towards centralization of decision making.
5
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ESSAYS ON HUMAN CAPITAL 
Jessica Helen Pérez Reynosa 




tralized than older firms.4
The nature of the decision is also important. Aghion and Tirole (1997) show that the need
to delegate authority is higher for decisions that involve large private benefits for the agent while
the decisions about projects that involve a large pay-off to the principal tend to be centralized.
For instance, decisions such as hiring staff, that affects the agent’s power and personal relation-
ships with subordinates, are more likely to be delegated whereas decisions that require greater
coordination should be retained with the agent’s superior.
Finally, given the principal-agent problem it is necessary to also take into consideration the
use of pay incentives. Colombo and Delmastro (2004) argue that the degree of decentralization
is influenced by the ability of the principal to design efficient incentive schemes to induce certain
behavior of the agent and so the use of individual pay incentives would be associated to higher
decentralization.
1.2.2 External Factors
Among the external factors to the firm that affect decentralization we focus on the conditions of
the markets in which firms operate; in particular, product market competition and whether or not
the firm operates in international markets. Regarding product market competition, Guadalupe
and Wulf (2010) argue that competition increases the need for timely decisions that make better
use of local knowledge and find that it leads to flatter firms. However, Bloom et al. (2012) present
counter-arguments to this notion: very strong competition, i.e., more firms, means more public
knowledge so there is less need to delegate to privately knowledgeable managers, and conclude
that ultimately the effect of competition on decentralization is an empirical issue. The export
status of a firm is also important because an establishment selling in a foreign market will be
under higher competitive pressures to adopt the most productive work system and this may lead
to more flexible work organizations (Osterman, 1994). Empirically, Marin and Verdier (2003)
find that greater international competition leads to the delegation of authority from the CEO to
the managers and Wait and Meagher (2008) find that workplaces that export are more likely to
decentralize decision-making rights.
4According to their data about 45% of the firms under the age of five years are decentralized, compared to 30%
for the older firms.
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The data comes from a unique survey on small and medium-sized firms,5 conducted during 2005
and 2006 in the Spanish region of Catalonia.6 It contains a rich set of questions and information
that is not typically available in standard firm-level datasets.7 All in all, it includes information
for a cross-section of about 500 firms covering the main manufacturing and service sectors repre-
sentative of the Catalan economy. For homogeneity and ease of comparability, in this paper we
focus on manufacturing SMEs, that is, 318 firms.8 Workers from three different hierarchical levels
(core employees, supervisors and managers) in each firm were sampled randomly. On average,
about half of the workforce in a firm was interviewed and we have information on those workers
as well.
Table 1.1 provides descriptive statistics of the firm and worker characteristics of the final
sample used in our main regression models.9 Notice that as these are small and medium-sized
enterprises, the average number of employees is rather small, 28 workers. A high percentage of
the firms (82%) are family business, on average they have 2 workcenters and the average firm age
is 30 years. As for the workers characteristics, most of them are male (78% of the interviewed
workers); they have on average 10 years of schooling; basic workers and supervisors have spent
on average 9 and 12 years, respectively working in the current firm. Finally, regarding incentive
payments, as there are many workers whose salary does not include a variable component, on
average, the percentage of the salary that depends on firm performance is rather small, 0.53%
and 1% of the wages of basic workers and supervisors, respectively.
5That is, firms with less than 250 employees.
6The survey is called “Enquesta Empresarial de Desenvolupament de Producte i Necessitats de Cualificacions
Transversals” and was run by the Catalonian SME association, Petita i Mitjana Empresa de Catalunya (PIMEC).
7The survey shares some similarities with the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS), upon
which it was based, containing additional questions not included in the WERS.
8They include the following two-digit NACE-code sectors: Food products and beverages (15), Chemicals (24),
Rubber and plastic products (25), Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment (28), Machinery
and mechanical equipment (29), Electrical machinery and instruments (31), Radio, television and communication
equipment (32), Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks (33), Motor vehicles, trailers and
semi-trailers (34), Furniture; manufacturing not elsewhere classified (36).
9As in Colombo and Delmastro (2004), in our main empirical models we stack the firm-level data according
to the eleven firm decisions we have information on, and create a pseudo-panel. As we have 318 firms and eleven
decisions for each firm, we have a total of 3, 498 firm-decision pairs. There are fewer observations in the cases of
those variables for which the information on some firms is missing.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics.
Obs. No. firms Mean Std. Dev.
Firm characteristics
Firm Size (No. of employees) 2332 212 28.439 28.857
Firm age 3267 297 30.256 23.727
Number of workcenters 3212 292 2.575 6.259
Family firm (dummy var) 3454 314 0.822 0.383
Internal Networks (dummy var) 3025 275 0.669 0.471
Sector: 3498 318
- Food and beverages (%) 16.04
- Chemicals (%) 0.31
- Rubber and plastics (%) 9.75
- Metal products (%) 30.5
- Mechanical machinery & equip (%) 20.13
- Electrical machinery & instruments (%) 10.06
- Radio, television & communication equip (%) 2.52
- Furniture (%) 8.18
- Others (%) 2.51
Worker characteristics
Gender (dummy var) 3498 318 0.784 0.251
Foreign (dummy var) 3454 314 0.068 0.185
Years of schooling 3498 318 10.073 2.099
Seniority of Basic workers (years) 3289 299 9.036 5.843
Seniority of Supervisors (years) 2574 234 12.297 8.175
Age of workers 3498 318 38.996 5.572
Incentivesa:
- Supervisors 3355 305 0.533 2.203
- Basic workers 2673 243 0.989 3.732
External Factors
Intensity of competition 3421 311 2.132 0.694
Export intensity 3322 302 0.337 0.778
Note: a Percentage of salary depending on firm performance.
1.3.1 Measuring Decentralization
The survey contains questions on who in the firm decides on a number of issues. In particular,
the following firm decisions are considered: i) daily tasks planning, ii) weekly tasks planning,
iii) follow-up of results, iv) customer relations, v) quality control, vi) supply purchases, vii)
machinery and equipment maintenance, viii) job listing, ix) hiring, x) production technology
choice and xi) training. The possible answers to those questions range from 1 to 5, depending
on who makes the decision: the firm’s owner (value 1), manager (value 2), supervisor (value 3),
a group of workers (value 4) or basic workers (value 5). Thus, according to our definition of
decentralization a value of 5 corresponds to the greatest degree of delegation or decentralization
of decisions and a value of 1 to the greatest degree of centralization, while a value of 3 would
constitute partial delegation.
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It is worthwhile pointing out that the degree of centralization of decisions for these small and
medium-sized firms is quite high. In most firms many of the decisions are taken by the owner
or the manager. Only 3.6% and 2.9% of the firm-decisions observations correspond to core/basic
employees and to a group of workers, respectively, with partial delegation to the supervisor
accounting for 23.2% of the observations. Thus, in order to avoid econometric problems of thin
cells for low levels of centralization, we group some of the answers to the decision questions and
consider 2 possible models depending on how the dependent variable is defined:
• A model of Centralization (if the decision is taken by the firm’s owner or manager), Partial
Delegation (if the decision is made by a supervisor) and Decentralization (if the decision is
made by either a group of workers or core employees). Figure 1.1 (a) shows the distribution
of the allocation of decision rights in this case, with 70.3% of the observations indicating
centralization, 23.2% representing partial delegation and 6.5% decentralization.
• A model of just Centralization (if the decision is taken by firm’s owner or manager) and
Decentralization (if the decision is made by a supervisor, a group of workers or core em-
ployees). As Figure 1.1 (b) shows, 29.7% of the observations correspond to decentralization
now.
In the first case we estimate an ordered probit model whereas in the second case we estimate
a simple probit model.
1.3.2 Measuring the Determinants of Decentralization
Based on our discussion on internal and external factors, we briefly discuss the proxies used in
our empirical analysis for each of the determinants of decentralization, as well as their expected
signs.10
Firm size is measured as the logarithm of the number of employees in the firm and, according
to the literature, we would expect it to have a positive impact on decentralization. The organiza-
tional structure of the firm is captured by Workcenters, the number of workcenters that the firm
has and its expected sign is uncertain. As a proxy for information communication technologies
we use a dummy variable (Internal Networks) that takes value one if the firm has an intranet and
zero otherwise. As explained above, its expected sign is ambiguous.
10Table 1.5 in Appendix 1 lists all variables with definitions and expected sign.
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Figure 1.1: Allocation of Decision Rights within the Firm (based on the question in the survey
“Who makes decision...?”).















(a) Distribution of the allocation of decision rights (Model











(b) Distribution of the allocation of decision rights (Model
2): Centralization (70.3%) and Decentralization (29.7%).
As for the workers variables, human capital is measured as the average years of schooling of
the workers in the firm and their experience in the firm (seniority).11 We expect these variables to
have a positive impact on the delegation of authority. Importantly, we also consider the dispersion
of workers skills; in particular, the standard deviation of years of schooling (years of schooling std
dev) and experience (seniority std dev) of workers in the firm. There is no theory on whether a
more or less homogeneous labor force facilitates the delegation of authority from top to bottom
workers and so a priori there is no expected sign on these variables. The use of incentive schemes
to motivate employees is proxied by Supervisor incentives and Basic worker incentives which are
respectively the percentage of their wages that depend on firm performance. Based on the theory,
we would expect a positive effect of these variables on decentralization.
We also include a dummy variable for family firms. Family firms are different from non-family
firms in a number of dimensions. For example, Bassanini et al. (2013) show that family firms
tend to have lower compensation packages but also lower job insecurity. It is not unreasonable
11Ideally we would like to include the overall work experience of the workers but we only know the number of
years they have been working in the current firm. Thus, although imperfect, we use it as a proxy for experience.
Another issue with this variable to bear in mind (and that might complicate the interpretation of results) is its
high correlation with workers age.
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to think then that family firms might have different organizational arrangements in terms of
decision-making as well. Although there is no formal prediction on the literature on delegation,
Colombo and Delmastro (2004) argue that owner-managers (about 89% of the observations in
our sample) may be unwilling to delegate authority due to personal preferences for autocratic
decision-making.
Regarding the external factors influencing decentralization we include two proxies for product-
market conditions: a variable directly measuring the intensity of competition and the firm’s
export intensity. The former is based on the subjective answers to the question in the survey
“Considering the market in which the company operates (national, international), how many
competing firms are there?” Possible answers range from 1 (“few competitors”) to 3 (“many
competitors”). So, a high value of this variable corresponds to a more competitive environment.
The firm’s export intensity was constructed from the information on the firms market share in
domestic and international markets. In particular, we took the ratio between the share of sales in
foreign markets versus the share of sales in the domestic market. Although there is no consensus
on the effect of intensity of competition, most previous empirical studies have obtained a positive
correlation between export intensity and decentralization.
We complete the list of explanatory variables with some additional controls for the workforce
such as the ratio of men to women and the percentage of foreigners in the firm. We also control
for the effect of each particular decision by including decision-specific dummies.12
1.4 Empirical Model and Results
As explained, we use the answers to the 11 firm decisions contained in the survey as our measure
of decentralization or delegation of authority within the firm and estimate two types of models:
1. Discrete choice models (ordered probit and simple probit models) on the stacked data of
firm-decision observations and
2. OLS models with a (continuous) decentralization index at the firm-level as dependent vari-
able.
We explain each type of model and present the estimation results next.
12We estimated different specifications of the model. The results reported include individual decision dummies
but we also estimated other specifications with decision-group dummies instead of individual decision dummies
obtaining qualitatively similar results.
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1.4.1 Discrete Choice Models
The choice of allocation of authority across hierarchical levels reflects the firm’s profit maximiza-
tion. Let D∗ij denote the “optimal” allocation of authority over decision i for firm j, which is
given by:
D∗ij = γXj + vi + εij, (i = 1, . . . , 11; j = 1, . . . , 318) (1.1)
where Xj is the vector of firm internal and external factors governing decentralization, as well as
other firm and worker controls, vi is a decision-specific fixed effect and εij is a random disturbance
term.
We do not observe D∗ij but just a latent variable, Dij, which in the case of the ordered probit
model takes values from 1 to 3 and whose relation with the optimal allocation of authority is as
follows:
Dij = 1 (Centralization) if D
∗
ij ≤ µ1
Dij = 2 (Partial Delegation) if µ1 < D
∗
ij ≤ µ2




Or in the case of a simple probit model:
Dij = 0 (Centralization) if D
∗
ij ≤ µ0




with µk being, in either case, the threshold that separates the different discrete categories of
delegation of authority.
Table 1.2 reports the marginal effects of the baseline ordered probit estimation. Since we
are interested in the decentralization of decision rights, we will focus on the marginal effects
of this outcome. Decentralization is negatively and significantly associated to the use of intra-
firm communication technologies (Internal Networks). In particular, using internal networks
decreases the probability to delegate decisions onto basic workers by 3 percentage points and it
increases the probability of either the firm’s owner or the manager making the decisions by 13
percentage points. This means that the use of an intranet and other communication technologies
makes it easier for the owner or the manager to have access to all the relevant information as to
make herself the decisions without having to delegate on workers (decentralization) or supervisors
(partial delegation).
Firm size does not result significant –and as we will see, it is not significant in any of the other
models. This constitutes an important difference with previous empirical studies considering
larger firms that generally find quite a robust positive effect of firm size on decentralization. The
fact that we do not find it here makes us think that there is a minimum firm size beyond which
12
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ESSAYS ON HUMAN CAPITAL 
Jessica Helen Pérez Reynosa 




the costs of information transfer and communication entailed by centralization are too high so
that it becomes optimal for firms to decentralize decisions. Given our dataset of SMEs, firm size
might be too “small” as to capture that effect. With reference to the other firm characteristics,
firm age has the expected negative sign although it fails to be statistically significant, while the
coefficients on the number of workcenters and being a family firm are also insignificant.
With regard to workers characteristics, the average years of schooling is positively and sig-
nificantly correlated to decentralization. The probability of decentralization increases by 0.3
percentage points (and that of centralization decreases by 1.3 percentage points) with one addi-
tional year of average schooling of the firm’s labor force. On the other hand, average seniority has
a null effect on delegation. The other relevant and statistically significant result is the negative
correlation between the dispersion of workers schooling and decentralization. This means that the
delegation of decisions from top to bottom workers is more likely the more homogeneous, in terms
of skills or education, is the workforce.13 Delegation also appears to be positively associated to
pay incentives to both basic workers and supervisors, although the coefficient is only statistically
different from zero in the case of supervisors.14 Basing part of the supervisors’ salaries on firm
performance increases the probability of delegation to workers (decentralization) by 0.1 percent-
age points and that of partial delegation by 0.5 percentage points. As for the additional control
on workers characteristics, it is worthwhile to note the negative and significant coefficient on the
dummy variable for being a foreigner. That is, firms with a higher percentage of foreign workers
tend to decentralize (even partially delegate) less whereas the gender composition does not seem
to have any significant impact on delegation.
The external factors considered here have signs that are in line with those obtained in pre-
vious empirical studies: the firm export intensity is positively and significantly correlated with
decentralization while the effect of the intensity of competition (which is based on the manager’s
13Decentralization also appears positively correlated to the dispersion of workers seniority. We do not want to
stress much this result though, because the first moment (average seniority) is irrelevant (a coefficient of small
magnitude and statistically insignificant) and, as pointed out, seniority in the firm is an imperfect measure of
human capital. Moreover, as Tables 1.6 through 1.8 show (See Appendix 1), this result is not as robust as the
relation between delegation and the dispersion of workers schooling.
14Throughout all the specifications, the point estimates on workers pay incentives display large standard errors
that prevent the coefficients from being statistically significant. This could respond to an identification problem
as few workers in the dataset receive pay incentives and even for those who do receive them the percentage of
their wages depending on firm performance is rather small. In other words, there is not much variability in these
variables whose values tend to cluster around 0.
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Table 1.2: Results of the Baseline Ordered Probit Model: Marginal Effects.
Centralization Partial Deleg. Decentralization
P [Dec = 1] P [Dec = 2] P [Dec = 3]
Firm Size 0.022 -0.018 -0.004
(0.022) (0.018) (0.004)
Internal Networks 0.134*** -0.104*** -0.030***
(0.037) (0.028) (0.010)
Workcenters -0.002 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Firm age 0.024 -0.020 -0.005
(0.025) (0.020) (0.005)
Years of schooling -0.013* 0.011* 0.003*
(0.008) (0.006) (0.002)
Years of schooling (Std. dev) 0.069*** -0.056*** -0.013***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.004)
Seniority -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Seniority (Std. dev) -0.015*** 0.012*** 0.003***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.001)
Basic workers incentives -0.005 0.004 0.001
(0.008) (0.007) (0.002)
Supervisor incentives -0.006* 0.005* 0.001*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Intensity of competition 0.029 -0.023 -0.006
(0.022) (0.018) (0.004)
Export intensity -0.089*** 0.072*** 0.017***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.004)
Family firm -0.049 0.040 0.009
(0.034) (0.028) (0.006)
Ratio of men to women 0.007 -0.005 -0.001
(0.036) (0.029) (0.007)
Foreign 0.197*** -0.159*** -0.038***
(0.071) (0.057) (0.015)
PST -0.141*** 0.110*** 0.031***
(0.030) (0.023) (0.008)
Provinces dummies Yes Yes Yes
Decision dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 1,297 1,297 1,297
Log Likelihood -826.36 -826.36 -826.36
Pseudo-R2 0.18 0.18 0.18
Notes: Categorical Dependent Variable: Centralization, Partial Delegation and Decentralization.
This table reports the marginal effects for each possible outcome of the dependent variable. ***
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Robust stand. errors in parentheses.
subjective perception) would be inconclusive as the coefficient fails to be statistically significant.
Finally, as the cross-section nature of the data does not allow us to use firm-fixed effects but
only decision-specific fixed effects, it is important to somehow control for some of the remaining
unobserved heterogeneity at the firm-level by including variables that might be correlated with
the tendency to delegate authority. One type of such variables is the use of certain Human
Resource Practices that go hand in hand with the delegation of decisions from top to bottom
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Table 1.3: Results of the Baseline Probit Model.
Marginal Effects Std. Error
Firm Size -0.032 (0.022)
Internal Networks -0.104*** (0.040)
Workcenters 0.003* (0.002)
Firm age -0.015 (0.027)
Years of schooling 0.012 (0.008)
Years of schooling (Std. dev) -0.071*** (0.019)
Seniority -0.001 (0.004)
Seniority (Std. dev) 0.017*** (0.005)
Basic workers incentives -0.002 (0.009)
Supervisor incentives 0.006 (0.004)
Intensity of competition -0.038* (0.022)
Export intensity 0.099*** (0.022)
Family firm 0.038 (0.036)









Notes: Dependent Variable: Decentralization. This table reports the marginal
effects of the baseline probit model. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%,
* Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
workers. Thus, we use a dummy variable for whether the firm uses Problems Solution Teams
(PST), one of the human resource management practices for which information is available.15
By and large, we obtain the same qualitative results with our baseline probit model where
decentralization is defined as the allocation of decision rights to any hierarchical level below the
manager. The estimation results are presented in Table 1.3. Clearly, we confirm the negative
correlation between decentralization and the use of internal communication technologies and the
dispersion of workers education, and the positive correlation between decentralization and export
intensity. In this case, we also obtain a positive correlation between delegation and the number
of workcenters and a negative and significant (at the 10% significance level) effect of intensity
of competition on the probability to decentralize which is not completely incongruent with the
previous literature.
As robustness checks, we estimate the models separately for different groups of decisions. Using
factor analysis, we identify the decisions that are more related among them and consequently
15In all the models, this variable is statistically significant and positively correlated with decentralization.
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group the 11 firm decisions into 3 subgroups: task planning decisions (daily and weekly tasks
planning decisions), labor decisions (decisions on job listing, hiring and training) and production
decisions (that include the decisions on follow-up of results, quality control, supply purchases,
machinery and equipment maintenance and production technology choice). Tables 1.6 through
1.9 (see Appendix 1) report the results of the ordered probit estimation and for the simple probit
model for each of those sub-groups. Although we lose estimation precision when we split the
sample into the 3 decision subgroups and due to the large standard errors some of the variable
coefficients are no longer significant, we confirm the most important qualitative results obtained
for the pooled firm-decisions data. Decentralization is significant and negatively correlated with
the use of internal networks (in the case of production decisions), the heterogeneity of workers
educational levels (labor and task planning decisions) and the intensity of competition (task
planning decisions), whereas it is positively and significantly correlated with the firm export
intensity (production and labor decisions).
1.4.2 OLS Models
Alternatively to the estimation of discrete choice models on the stacked data of firm-decision
observations, we construct different continuous indices of decentralization at the firm-level and
estimate simple linear OLS models. In particular, we compute an overall index of decentralization
based on the 11 decisions and indices for the 3 different subgroups of decisions listed above, that
is, for task-planning, labor and production decisions.
Table 1.4 presents the OLS estimation results for those decentralization indices. It is worth-
while noting that as we have now only firm-level observations (instead of the pseudo-panel of
firm-decision observations) the sample size is considerably reduced and this results in large stan-
dard errors and identification problems in some of the specifications.16 Yet, we confirm the
robustness of most of our previous results. Firms with more homogeneous workforce in terms
of education tend to decentralize more –the coefficient on the dispersion of years of schooling is
negative throughout all the models and it is also highly significant with the only exception of
the group of production decisions. Delegation is also higher when firms use pay incentives for
basic workers, although this effect is only statistically significant in the pooled data. The use of
internal networks presents, except for task planning decisions, a negative coefficient that is now
only significant in the case of labor decisions. Other firm characteristics such as size or being
16There is complete information on all the relevant variables for a total of just 119 firms.
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Table 1.4: Estimation Results (OLS).
Only Only Only
All Task planning Labor Production
decisions decisions decisions decisions
Firm Size 0.040 0.137 0.039 0.024
(0.076) (0.107) (0.097) (0.076)
Internal Networks -0.201 0.114 -0.266* -0.274*
(0.129) (0.187) (0.156) (0.145)
Workcenters 0.005 0.019* 0.006 -0.002
(0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.005)
Firm age -0.074 -0.040 -0.087 -0.068
(0.087) (0.129) (0.118) (0.103)
Yrs. of schooling 0.035 0.075* 0.012 0.024
(0.028) (0.039) (0.036) (0.032)
Yrs. of schooling (Std. dev) -0.129** -0.247** -0.161* -0.067
(0.063) (0.096) (0.082) (0.071)
Seniority 0.004 0.012 0.009 -0.009
(0.013) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015)
Seniority (Std. dev) 0.023 0.012 0.003 0.050***
(0.016) (0.026) (0.021) (0.017)
Basic workers incentives 0.036* 0.040 0.042 0.019
(0.021) (0.028) (0.027) (0.023)
Supervisor incentives 0.002 0.014 -0.013 0.012
(0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014)
Intensity of competition -0.077 -0.254** -0.034 -0.029
(0.080) (0.106) (0.106) (0.082)
Export intensity 0.204*** 0.119 0.295*** 0.187**
(0.057) (0.073) (0.069) (0.073)
Family firm -0.022 -0.099 -0.065 0.037
(0.112) (0.162) (0.142) (0.129)
Ratio of men to women 0.002 0.050 0.025 -0.017
(0.145) (0.274) (0.155) (0.131)
Foreign -0.317 -0.554 0.114 -0.562*
(0.271) (0.447) (0.306) (0.297)
PST 0.301*** 0.303* 0.374** 0.284**
(0.113) (0.160) (0.145) (0.122)
Constant -0.001 -0.254 0.283 -0.112
(0.522) (0.690) (0.669) (0.562)
Provinces dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 119 119 119 119
R2 Adj. 0.11 0.21 0.06 0.09
F-stat 2.23 3.28 2.20 2.52
Log Likelihood -72.48 -115.31 -99.43 -83.54
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5 %, * Significant at 10 %. Robust standard errors
in parentheses.
a family firm continue to have statistically insignificant coefficients. Finally, decentralization is
higher (and this effect is generally statistically significant) for all decisions and for all groups of
decisions among those firms that export more while firms facing more intense competition tend to
centralize decisions more, although this correlation is only significant in the case of task planning
decisions.
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Using a unique dataset on SMEs, we empirically investigate the factors affecting decentralization
or delegation of authority within the firm in the case of small and medium-sized enterprises.
Since most of the studies on decentralization have looked at large companies, this is an important
contribution of the paper.
We consider eleven strategic decisions to a firm’s activity and test the predictions of economic
theory for a sample of 318 Spanish manufacturing firms. In particular, we estimate discrete choice
models on the probability to delegate decisions from the owner or manager to lower hierarchical
levels in the firm (basic workers and/or supervisors). Our main empirical results are easily
summarized. First, as found in previous studies, internal aspects of the firms such as the use of
internal networks or the number of workplaces affect the degree of decentralization of decisions
in the firm. External aspects such as product market conditions, proxied by the intensity of
competition and the firm’s export intensity, are significant determinants of delegation as well.
It is also important to note some of the differences we obtain with respect to the previous
empirical works considering larger firms. For instance, while the positive effect of firm size on
decentralization tends to be a generally pretty robust result, in our sample of small and medium-
sized firms it is never a significant explanatory factor of delegation of decisions. Other aspects
such as the use of pay incentives does not seem to matter much either. However, in this case
caution is in order as one can not be sure whether pay incentives genuinely do not affect the
allocation of decision-making rights in SMEs or whether this is rather an identification problem
due to the low use of this type of incentives.
Finally, we show that workers characteristics and the composition of the firm’s labor force are
also related to the delegation of decisions. In particular, workers with a higher educational level
and a more homogeneous labor force in terms of education are associated to higher degrees of
delegation in the firm.
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Table 1.6: Results of Ordered Probit Model (Marginal Effects): Task Planning Decisions.
Centralization Partial Deleg. Decentralization
P [Dec = 1] P [Dec = 2] P [Dec = 3]
Firm Size -0.049 0.046 0.003
(0.061) (0.058) (0.004)
Internal Networks -0.037 0.035 0.002
(0.088) (0.083) (0.005)
Workcenters -0.012** 0.011** 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.000)
Firm age -0.019 0.018 0.001
(0.067) (0.064) (0.004)
Years of schooling -0.032 0.031 0.002
(0.021) (0.020) (0.001)
Years of schooling (Std. dev) 0.166*** -0.157*** -0.009*
(0.047) (0.045) (0.005)
Seniority -0.007 0.007 0.000
(0.009) (0.009) (0.000)
Seniority (Std. dev) -0.007 0.007 0.000
(0.013) (0.012) (0.001)
Basic workers incentives -0.023 0.022 0.001
(0.024) (0.022) (0.001)
Supervisor incentives -0.014 0.014 0.001
(0.009) (0.008) (0.001)
Intensity of competition 0.127** -0.120** -0.007*
(0.057) (0.055) (0.004)
Export intensity -0.056 0.053 0.003
(0.049) (0.046) (0.003)
Family firm 0.012 -0.011 -0.001
(0.089) (0.084) (0.005)
Ratio of men to women -0.092 0.087 0.005
(0.109) (0.103) (0.007)
Foreign 0.243 -0.230 -0.013
(0.229) (0.217) (0.014)
PST -0.149* 0.139* 0.010
(0.078) (0.073) (0.007)
Provinces dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 236 236 236
Log Likelihood -157.35 -157.35 -157.35
Pseudo-R2 0.14 0.14 0.14
Notes: Categorical Dependent Variable: Centralization, Partial Delegation and Decentralization.
This table reports the marginal effects for each possible outcome of the dependent variable. ***
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Robust stand. errors in parentheses.
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Table 1.7: Results of Ordered Probit Model (Marginal Effects): Labor Decisions.
Centralization Partial Deleg. Decentralization
P [Dec = 1] P [Dec = 2] P [Dec = 3]
Firm Size 0.057 -0.043 -0.013
(0.039) (0.031) (0.009)
Internal Networks 0.086 -0.064 -0.022
(0.062) (0.044) (0.019)
Workcenters -0.003 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Firm age -0.010 0.008 0.002
(0.037) (0.028) (0.009)
Years of schooling -0.003 0.002 0.001
(0.011) (0.009) (0.003)
Years of schooling (Std. dev) 0.085*** -0.065*** -0.020**
(0.029) (0.023) (0.008)
Seniority -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.002)
Seniority (Std. dev) -0.003 0.002 0.001
(0.008) (0.006) (0.002)
Basic workers incentives -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.013) (0.010) (0.003)
Supervisor incentives 0.004 -0.003 -0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.001)
Intensity of competition 0.008 -0.006 -0.002
(0.036) (0.028) (0.009)
Export intensity -0.106*** 0.081*** 0.025***
(0.031) (0.025) (0.009)
Family firm -0.028 0.022 0.007
(0.058) (0.045) (0.013)
Ratio of men to women -0.019 0.015 0.005
(0.056) (0.043) (0.013)
Foreign -0.039 0.030 0.009
(0.095) (0.073) (0.022)
PST -0.093* 0.069* 0.024*
(0.051) (0.038) (0.014)
Provinces dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 350 350 350
Log Likelihood -195.91 -195.91 -195.91
Pseudo-R2 0.09 0.09 0.09
Notes: Categorical Dependent Variable: Centralization, Partial Delegation and Decentralization.
This table reports the marginal effects for each possible outcome of the dependent variable. ***
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Robust stand. errors in parentheses.
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Table 1.8: Results of Ordered Probit Model (Marginal Effects): Production Decisions.
Centralization Partial Deleg. Decentralization
P [Dec = 1] P [Dec = 2] P [Dec = 3]
Firm Size 0.004 -0.003 -0.002
(0.033) (0.019) (0.014)
Internal Networks 0.165*** -0.089*** -0.077***
(0.054) (0.027) (0.029)
Workcenters 0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm age 0.043 -0.025 -0.018
(0.038) (0.022) (0.016)
Years of schooling -0.007 0.004 0.003
(0.012) (0.007) (0.005)
Years of schooling (Std. dev) 0.026 -0.015 -0.011
(0.025) (0.015) (0.011)
Seniority 0.007 -0.004 -0.003
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
Seniority (Std. dev) -0.027*** 0.016*** 0.011***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.003)
Basic workers incentives 0.007 -0.004 -0.003
(0.013) (0.008) (0.005)
Supervisor incentives -0.009* 0.006 0.004
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
Intensity of competition -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.032) (0.019) (0.013)
Export intensity -0.077*** 0.045*** 0.032***
(0.022) (0.013) (0.009)
Family firm -0.077 0.047 0.030
(0.052) (0.033) (0.019)
Ratio of men to women 0.019 -0.011 -0.008
(0.063) (0.037) (0.026)
Foreign 0.330*** -0.194*** -0.136***
(0.109) (0.064) (0.047)
PST -0.152*** 0.084*** 0.068***
(0.044) (0.024) (0.022)
Provinces dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 593 593 593
Log Likelihood -481.21 -481.21 -481.21
Pseudo-R2 0.06 0.06 0.06
Notes: Categorical Dependent Variable: Centralization, Partial Delegation and Decentralization.
This table reports the marginal effects for each possible outcome of the dependent variable. ***
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Robust stand. errors in parentheses.
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Table 1.9: Results of Probit Model for each Group of Decisions: Marginal Effects.
Only Task planning Only Labor Only Production
decisions decisions decisions
Firm Size 0.023 -0.061* -0.017
(0.058) (0.037) (0.033)
Internal Networks 0.053 -0.056 -0.141**
(0.091) (0.063) (0.057)
Workcenters 0.012* 0.004 -0.002
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Firm age 0.043 0.006 -0.022
(0.069) (0.039) (0.042)
Years of schooling 0.028 0.004 0.002
(0.021) (0.012) (0.013)
Years of schooling (Std. dev) -0.155*** -0.076** -0.032
(0.047) (0.030) (0.028)
Seniority 0.012 -0.000 -0.010
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Seniority (St. Dev.) 0.001 0.003 0.030***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
Basic workers incentives 0.006 -0.001 -0.012
(0.027) (0.014) (0.014)
Supervisor incentives 0.020 -0.001 0.010
(0.013) (0.007) (0.007)
Intensity of competition -0.138** -0.008 -0.004
(0.055) (0.034) (0.033)
Export intensity 0.054 0.105*** 0.105***
(0.057) (0.033) (0.032)
Family firm -0.040 0.031 0.056
(0.095) (0.057) (0.056)
Ratio of men to women 0.059 0.033 -0.008
(0.101) (0.063) (0.061)
Foreign -0.186 0.060 -0.265**
(0.232) (0.120) (0.124)
PST 0.180** 0.097* 0.155***
(0.081) (0.054) (0.049)
Provinces dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 236 350 593
Log Likelihood -139.59 -159.39 -357.73
Pseudo-R2 0.14 0.11 0.07
Notes: Dependent Variable: Decentralization. This table reports the marginal effects of the probit
model for each group of decision. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
26
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ESSAYS ON HUMAN CAPITAL 
Jessica Helen Pérez Reynosa 




Do More Educated Leaders Raise Citizens’ Education?
2.1 Introduction
Recent literature has been demonstrated that leaders play an important role by affecting policy
and economic outcomes (Jones and Olken, 2005; Dreher et al., 2009; Besley et al., 2011) and
that citizens (voters) pay more attention to leaders’ characteristics rather than political parties
(Besley and Coate, 1997; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996). More specifically, literature shows that
leaders’ quality, measured by their educational level and personal background, matters for eco-
nomic growth (Dreher et al., 2009; Besley et al., 2011) and reforms (Dreher et al., 2009; Göhlmann
and Vaubel, 2007) in a country.
According to Besley et al. (2011), leaders matters for growth since some of them are more
competent than others and are more able to make better policy choices which enhance economic
performance. They consider that the return to having more educated leaders comes from the
assumption that highly educated leaders are also better citizens and are more likely to act in the
benefit of public interest.1
The main goal of this paper is analyze whether political leaders would matter for policy
outcomes and more specifically those regarding the educational achievement of the population.
We consider that one of the key means that the leader has an effect on outcomes is his/her
1Besley et al. (2011) define a ’highly’ educated leader as one who has at least a postgraduate qualification.
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educational attainment. So, a possible explanation to the potential effect of leader’s education
on economic growth could be through enhancing the education of the population. Human capital
is an important input into the production function of a country and has been emphasized as a
critical determinant of economic progress.
Our paper contributes to the literature on leaders’ characteristics and their impact on coun-
tries’ outcomes. We look at the contribution of a leader to enhance citizens’ education. We
investigate how the educational attainment of population is affected while a leader with higher
education remains in office. For this purpose, we consider educational transitions of the leaders
defined as the change in the educational level of political leader from one mandate to other. Us-
ing a dataset for the period 1970-2004 and over 140 countries, we show that there is a significant
effect of these transitions on our measure of educational attainment of the population.
Given the aim described above, the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 begins with an
overview of literature that highlights the importance of political leader on different policy out-
comes and especially those that emphasize education as a major feature of the leader; Section 2.3
provides the conceptual framework of our hypothesis; Section 2.4 describes the databases and vari-
ables used; Section 2.5 describes the econometric model and method of estimation; Section 2.6
presents the results and finally, Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
Recently, a growing body of literature studies the importance of leader’s characteristics in ex-
plaining outcomes. From a theoretical point of view, as Besley et al. (2011) note, this can be
motivated using the citizen-candidate type approach as presented in Besley and Coate (1997)
and Osborne and Slivinski (1996). These authors model political competition as a game between
citizens competing to hold public office, where selection based on policy preferences, talent or
virtue can affect policy outcomes.
From the empirical side, some studies look at the influence of leaders and their personal char-
acteristics on political and economic outcomes such as economic policy, monetary policy and
changes in the form of government. Related to the influence of leaders, i.e. who is the head
of government, Jones and Olken (2005) show that the quality of leaders matters for economic
growth. They stand the role of national leadership rather than the deterministic country charac-
teristics and relatively persistent policy variables that have been focused in the most econometric
work explaining economic growth. This is precisely the conceptual framework we adopt in this
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paper. Later, Jones and Olken (2009) investigate the effects of assassinations and assassination
attempts against political leaders on the institutional setup within a country between 1875 and
2004. They find that a successful assassination of autocrats will significantly increase the likeli-
hood of a transition to democracy thereafter. A related study by Hayo and Voigt (2011) produce
similar results. Hayo and Voigt (2011) find that changes in the constitution can be explained by
characteristics of the political system, internal and external political conflicts, and political lead-
ers, whereas economic and socio-demographic variables do not matter. Despite the results of both
Jones and Olken (2009) and Hayo and Voigt (2011) demonstrate that the circumstances under
which the reign of political leaders is terminated matter for changes in the form of government,
their results do not indicate whether individual characteristics of political leaders themselves are
relevant for such changes.
Some studies highlight the gender of the leader as a relevant characteristic and investigate the
impact of women on economic policy. For instance, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) analyze the
influence of women representation in local councils in India on the types of locally provided public
goods. They show that council members invest more in infrastructure that is directly related to the
needs of their own gender. According to their findings women invest more in infrastructure such
as water and roads while men in education.2 Similarly, Svaleryd (2009) studies whether women’s
representation in Swedish local councils affects local public expenditure structures and finds a
positive relation between the share of women on local councils and the spending on child care
and education relative to elderly care. Dollar et al. (2001) study the role of women in government
by examining the relationship between female participation in government legislatures and the
level of perceived corruption. Their results show that increases in female participation lead to
more honest government since countries exhibit lower levels of corruption. Also, Baltrunaite et al.
(2012) analyze the effects of gender quotas in politics on the quality of politicians and show that
the increase in female representation increases the average education level of elected politicians.
Other relevant characteristics are leaders’ educational attainment and professional background.
Our study is framed in the literature that stresses the impact of leaders’ education on economic
outcomes. Göhlmann and Vaubel (2007) find strong evidence that the inflation preferences of
members of the central bank council depend on their education and professional experience. Ac-
cording to their findings, more law graduates in the council come along with higher inflation
2This paper is framed for studies on the effect of political reservation, i.e. reserving political office for particular
groups in the population. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) studied reservations for women and they argue that
reservation matters by changing the identities of those elected to office.
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rates compared to economists while former members of the central bank staff are accompanied
by significantly lower inflation rates than former politicians. Dreher et al. (2009) studied the
impact of education and profession on implementation of market-liberalizing reforms and found
that entrepreneurs, professional scientists, and trained economists are significantly more reform
oriented. For these authors when it comes to designing reform policy, politicians’ education and
professional experience is likely to be important. Congleton and Zhang (2009) use a similar ap-
proach and analyze the influence of U.S. presidents on economic growth. Their results indicate
that higher levels of education and specific professional experiences of a president substantially
increase economic growth. Constant and Tien (2010) show that foreign education of the leaders
matters for Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) inflows in their home countries above and beyond
standard determinants of FDI which are also essential for a country’s economic growth. Finally,
Besley et al. (2011) expand the set of random leadership transitions to show that leaders matter
for growth as in the previous work of Jones and Olken (2005) and provide evidence supporting the
view that heterogeneity among leaders’ educational attainment is important with growth being
higher by having leaders who are more highly educated.
2.3 Hypothesis
Our hypothesis is derived from the findings described in the previous section. It has been found
that the elected representative (leader), at least to some degree, can pursue his or her own interests
(Svaleryd, 2009). For instance, a general finding is that women prefer higher social spending than
men (Lott and Kenny, 1999; Abrams and Settle, 1999; Aidt and Dallal, 2008).3 Also, Hayo
and Neumeier (2012) found that governments led by prime ministers from a poor socioeconomic
background spend significantly more on social security, education, health, infrastructure, and
public safety. Since these results support the idea that leaders spend more in certain areas
according to their preferences, we expect that more educated leaders invest more in education
issues.
As mentioned before, some authors highlight the impact of the educational level of leaders on
economic growth, but they did not give further explanation on the ‘why’. We hypothesize that a
potential explanation for this link is that more educated leaders will take decisions and promote
3Abrams and Settle (1999), Aidt and Dallal (2008) and Lott and Kenny (1999) study the effect of women’s
suffrage on the growth of welfare state and the scope of government. Their findings show that social spending is
systematically higher where women have and use the right to vote.
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policies that will increase the human capital of the population. A greater stock of human capital
implies a more skilled and productive workforce, which in turn will increase country’s output
(Barro and Lee, 2001).
Economic theory suggests that human capital is an important determinant of growth, and
empirical evidence for a broad group of countries confirms this linkage (Barro, 1991; Benhabib
and Spiegel, 1994; Romer, 1986, 1989; Lucas, 1988; Jones and Manuelli, 1990). According to these
theories, human capital can boost growth through stimulating technological creation, invention
and innovation, as well as facilitating the uptake and imitation of new technologies. Also, countries
that start with a higher level of educational attainment in their population grow faster for a given
level of initial per capita GDP and for given values of policy-related variables (Barro, 1991).
While there is little doubt of the theoretical importance of human capital for economic growth,
and that only by providing more and more education countries can continue to prosper in a
globalized economy, there has yet to emerge a consensus among empirical growth researchers
on how to measure and model human capital in growth regressions. Some authors consider
that education contributes to economic growth and productivity, but beyond a threshold its
contribution is small and uncertain. For instance, Wolf (2002) argues that high private returns to
education are not matched by high or consistent social returns, and that even if some education
has a positive impact cannot be extrapolated endlessly as education expands. Sala-I-Martin et al.
(2004) create a list of variables that are robust in explaining long-term economic growth, in this
list one of the most important variables is the primary education enrollment rate.
2.4 Dataset and Variables
Our dataset on political leaders contains information for 214 countries over the period 1848-
2004. However, for country level educational attainment there is only available data after 1970.
Therefore, we restrict our study to the period 1970-2004 and over 140 countries. The database was
constructed from different sources as explained below. In order to identify the primary ruler in
each country and year we use Archigos data.4 This database identifies the effective leader of each
independent state and year based on the characteristics of the political system in place between
1875 and 2004 for 188 countries where two rules are generally followed: i) in Parliamentary
regimes, the prime minister is coded as the ruler while in Presidential systems, it is the president;
ii) in communist states, the Chairman of the Party is coded as the effective ruler.
4For more details about this data see Goemans et al. (2009).
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The educational data for the leaders has been collected by Besley and Reynal-Querol.5 This
dataset contains information on leaders’ educational attainment for a core sample of 1,672 leaders
in 193 countries between 1847 and 2004. The database provides, as a measure of educated leaders,
a core variable called College degree which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the leader has college
or post-graduate education (i.e. master’s degree or PhD).6 We use College degree to construct
the educational transitions which are explained in more detail below.
For population’s educational attainment at country level, income per capita and other country
characteristics we use World Bank data.7 Following Persson and Tabellini (2009), our measure
of democracy is based on the Polity IV data covering all major independent states in the global
system over the period 1800-2012. This data provides a measure of democracy (POLITY2) which
capture three different dimensions: how competitive and open the recruitment of chief executive
is; the extent to which the chief executive is constrained institutionally; and how competitive
and regulated political participation is (Besley et al., 2011). Finally, we assemble a new database
which contains information on 587 leaders and 165 countries where the primary completion rate
was available (2800 obs.).8
Table 2.1 contains the description of the outcome variable and the explanatory variables used
in this work. Our outcome variable is population’s primary education completion rate (hereafter
PCRT ). This variable is constructed as the ratio, expressed in percentage, between the total
number of new entrants in the last grade of primary education, regardless of age, and the total
population of the theoretical entrance age to the last grade of primary. It is calculated by taking
the total number of students in the last grade of primary school, minus the number of repeaters
in that grade, divided by the total number of children of official graduation age. The ratio can
exceed 100% due to over-aged and under-aged children who enter primary school late/early and/or
repeat grades. This variable is the one which is available for a broader sample of countries and
years.
In order to assess the impact of changes in the education of political leaders, we create two
types of transitions: positive and negative. A positive transition is picked-up by a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 when a country transitions from a non-educated leader (a leader with no
5We thank Besley and Reynal Querol for providing their database.
6See Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) for more details on the construction of this dataset.
7Education data comes from wbopendata available in Stata developed by Azevedo (2011).
8Our sample selection is driven by data availability. While data on education are available for 214 countries
over the period 1848-2004, we lose observations due to missing control variables. The list of leaders considered in
our sample are shown in Table 2.4 in Appendix 2.
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college education) to an educated one (a leader with at least college education) until the end of
the period in our sample. Analogously, a negative transition is picked-up by a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 when a country transitions from an educated leader (a leader with at least
college education) to a non-educated one (a leader with no college education) until the end of the
period. Countries that experience both types of transitions are excluded from the sample. As we
will explain later, countries that do not experience any transition will be used as a control group
to assess the impact of leaders educational transitions.
The leader characteristics we control for are education, age and time the leader remains in
office (tenure). Country controls are GDP per capita, number of grades (years) required to
complete primary education (duration of primary) and whether country’s political regime is a
democracy or not. In Table 2.2 we show a summary statistics of our data. In our sample, on
average, the primary completion rate is 73.3% and the duration of primary is about 5.75 years.
In 52.1% of the years there is a positive transition and in 7.9% of the years there is a negative
transition. In 46.1% of the country-year observations the regime is democratic. The average age
of a leader is about 56 years and the average number of years in office is about 8.52. We can
observe that all of them vary across countries and time.
Table 2.3 details descriptive statistics by group of countries. As can be seen, Latin America
and OECD countries do not experienced negative transitions during the period considered in our
sample. Concerning positive transitions, Latin America has the highest value with 75.7% of the
country-year observations, while the lowest value corresponds to Asia with 45.1%.
Figures 2.1 to 2.3 depict the evolution over time of different leaders’ characteristics (age,
tenure and education) for Latin America, Asia, Africa and OECD countries. In each graph of
these figures a dashed horizontal line indicates the overall mean of the characteristic for all the
period (1970-2004). In Figure 2.1, we observe that the average age of African leaders upon
entering in office is about 46 years , while in Asia it is about 49 years. Latin American leaders
are, on average, 52 years old, almost the same as in OECD countries which it is about 53. In
the case of Latin America and Asian countries, it can be seen a growing trend in the age of the
leaders at taking office. In this sense, more experienced leaders are being elected to rule as the
case of OECD countries who present the oldest leader’s age for holding office. In terms of the
number of years in office, Figure 2.2 shows that African and Asian leaders spend, on average,
more time in office that the heads of government in Latin American and OECD countries. More
specifically, on average the term of office for African leaders is 9.79 years, for an Asian leaders
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Figure 2.1: Average Age of Leaders at Taking office.














































































Note: The dashed horizontal line indicates the overall mean of the age of leaders –at taking office– for all the period (1970-2004).
Source: own elaboration.
is 9.53 years, while for Latin American and OECD leaders are 5.64 and 4.91 years, respectively.
Furthermore, we can observe that African leaders, on average, remain in power much longer than
their counterparts.
Figure 2.3 looks at the variation over time in the proportion of leaders who have college degree
across countries. We observe a growing tendency in the proportion of educated leaders. In this
figure, Asian countries experience the more dramatic increment in the proportion of educated
leaders ranging from 46% in 1970 to 80% in 2004. On average, Latin American and OECD
countries have higher proportions of educated leaders, 85% and 86%, respectively; while these
figures in African and Asian countries are 62% and 66%, respectively. It is worth noting, that
34
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ESSAYS ON HUMAN CAPITAL 
Jessica Helen Pérez Reynosa 




Figure 2.2: Average Tenure of Leaders (expressed in years).












































































Note: The dashed horizontal line indicates the overall mean of the tenure of leaders for all the period (1970-2004). Source: own
elaboration.
Latin American and OECD countries present almost the same evolution in the characteristics of
the leaders ruling in these countries during the period of our study. The same applies for Asian
and African countries.
Figure 2.4 displays the evolution of primary completion rate (PCRT ). In this figure, we observe
that, on average, OECD countries have the higher level of educational attainment given that about
96.77% of the students in the last grade of primary complete the primary education, while African
countries present the lowest rate (48.91%). For Latin American and Asian countries the rate of
students completing the last grade of primary are 77.19% and 80.26%, respectively. Comparing
Figures 2.3 and 2.4, we observe both an increase in the proportion of educated leaders and an
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Figure 2.3: Evolution of Proportion of Leaders with at least College Degree.














































































Note: The dashed horizontal line indicates the overall mean of the proportion of leaders with at least college degree for all the period
(1970-2004). Source: own elaboration.
increase in the primary completion rate.9
In order to illustrate the potential effect of the leaders’ educational transitions on the educa-
tional attainment of the population, Figure 2.5 shows the evolution of primary completion rate in
Italy and indicate when the transitions occurs. In the graph, a solid vertical line indicates the year
at which a leader without higher education came to power (negative transition), and a dashed
vertical line indicates the year at which a leader with higher education came to power (positive
transition). As can be seen in Figure 2.5, Italy experienced growth in the primary completion
9Figure 2.6 in Appendix 2 shows the same analysis across countries. In a descriptive way, our data shows that
countries with higher proportion of educated leaders have higher completion rates.
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Figure 2.4: Evolution of Primary Completion Rate.




































































Note: The dashed horizontal line indicates the overall mean of the Primary Completion Rate for all the period (1970-2004). Source:
own elaboration.
rate coincident with the positive transitions and experienced growth reversals in the completion
rate when a leader without higher education remained in office (negative transition). However,
the linkages between these transitions and particular changes in the primary completion rate may
be due to specific events occurring during that period. Therefore, in the next section we test our
hypothesis of whether more educated leaders matter for improving the educational attainment of
population using more rigorous econometric methods.
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Figure 2.5: Primary Completion Rate and Educational Transitions: Italy.



















Note: The solid vertical line indicates the year at which a leader without higher education came to power (negative transition). The
dashed line indicates the year at which a leader with higher education came to power (positive transition). Source: own elaboration.
2.5 Empirical Strategy
In order to test the hypothesis that leader’s education might have an impact on population’s
educational attainment, we consider the following empirical model:
∆yilt = α + yil,t−1δ + ditγ + Zltλ+ Xitβ + µl + εilt (2.1)
where yilt is the educational attainment of population (Primary Education Completion Rate)
in country i at time t while leader l is in office; ∆ is the difference operator; dit picks the transition,
the change of the educational level of the political leader in country i at time t; Zlt is a matrix
containing the leaders characteristics; Xit is a matrix containing a set of covariates controlling
for country characteristics; µl is a leader-specific fixed-effect; εilt is a time-varying error term,
and α, δ, γ, λ and β are a set of parameters to be estimated. Since we are interested in assessing
the impact of a characteristic of the political leader (education), the inclusion in Equation 2.1 of
leader specific effects is very convenient. On the one hand, we can control for leader’s unobserved
heterogeneity, which is not controlled for through the leader characteristics included in Zlt. On
the other hand, since one leader can be in office only in one country, the leader-specific effect also
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absorbs the country-specific effects.
Our main coefficient of interest is γ, which reflects the effect of the educational transition of
the leader (positive or negative) on the growth rate of the primary completion rate (PCRT ). In
order to assess the impact of an educational transition of the leader, countries are compared with
a control group of countries that not experience any transition. When we analyze the impact
of a positive transition (from a leader without to a leader with college education), countries
experiencing this type of transition are compared with countries that have non-educated leaders
during all period of study. On the contrary, countries experiencing negative transitions (from a
leader with to a leader without college education) are compared with countries that have leaders
with college education throughout the period of study (see Table 2.5 in Appendix 2).
Our outcome variable (yit) is the Primary Completion Rate (PCRT ). In order to capture po-
tential state-dependence in our outcome variable (∆yit), that is, changes in the level of education
of the population depends on its initial value when a leader takes office, we include our endoge-
nous variable lagged one period (yi,t−1). Those countries that have higher primary completion
rate will grow at a lower rate than those countries that have lower completion rates in t− 1.
The characteristics of the leader we consider are age and years in office (tenure). Age is
considered since this variable can be associated with cognitive abilities which are important
for political decision making and accurately expressing one’s political preferences or the level
of government responsiveness (Lau and Redlawsk, 2008). Tenure is also important, since is a
proxy of the leader’s experience. In order to control for differences between income levels across
countries, we include the GDP per capita lagged one year, and GDP growth. We also control
for democracy status, since the effect of the leader is supposed to be stronger in autocratic
environments where there are fewer constraints on a leader’s power compared to democratic
regimes (Jones and Olken, 2005; Barro, 1999). Finally, we control for the duration of the primary
which may affect the primary completion rate, since the longer the duration of primary the more
likely to dropout (Angrist and Krueger, 1991).
The econometric strategy used to estimate Equation 2.1 consists of differencing the equation
in order to remove the leader-specific effect µi. However, differencing means that even strictly
exogenous variables can become endogenous, in addition to the presence of non-strictly exoge-
nous variables. Therefore, by construction, in Equation 2.1 we have the lagged difference of our
endogenous variable and it may be that the difference of other explanatory variables is correlated
with the error term, which in turn creates a severe problem of endogeneity. Hence, our core
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specification will include not only correlated and heteroskedastic residuals, but also non-strictly
exogenous and endogenous variables as covariates. In this context, a fixed-effects model with the
Newey–West corrected covariance matrix provides consistent estimates of the standard errors in
the presence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the residuals. However, the presence of
endogenous covariates creates severe identification problems in the econometric estimation that
in turn lead to inconsistent estimate of model.
In order to estimate Equation 2.1, we use a variant of the Arellano and Bond (1991) Gen-
eralized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond
(1998) and Bond (2002) show that often lags for the levels of these variables are poor instruments,
and they suggest suitable conditions for fixing this problem. One alternative is to instrument en-
dogenous and non-strictly exogenous variables with lags of their own first differences, instead
of with lags for the variables in levels. The GMM variant of the original Arellano and Bond’s
estimator used here incorporates these elements. In particular, the method we use here has both
one-and two-step versions. We adopt the two-step method as it is the most efficient, though the
estimated variances tend to be biased downwards. In order to fix this, we apply the finite-sample
correction of the two-step covariance matrix proposed in Windmeijer (2005), without which those
standard errors tend to be severely downward biased.10
2.6 Empirical Results
Table 2.6 reports the results from the estimation of our core model (Equation 2.1) by the Gener-
alized Method of Moments (GMM) . Model 1 presents the results considering just the educational
level of the leader by a dummy variable (college degree or not). Models 2 and 3 show the effects
of the positive and negative transitions on the PCRT, respectively. As we mention in the previous
section, the control group for the positive transition are those countries which have non-educated
leader all period of study and for negative transition are those countries that have leaders with
college education throughout the period of study. Hence, the interpretation of all results regard-
ing the impact of the educational transition is relative to these baseline groups. We first comment
on the results regarding our control variables, and later we focus on our variables of interest.
Our results indicates that laggard countries in terms of educational achievement tend to
experience a greater growth rate of the PCRT, since we find a significant and negative effect of
the initial value of the primary completion rate (PCRTt−1) for all specifications.
10See Roodman (2009) for details.
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Controlling for leader’s characteristics, we find that age and tenure, which are proxies of
leader’s experience affect positively the educational attainment of the population. This result
indicates that the greater the experience of leaders the greater the effect on the educational level
of the population, since they are more able to make decisions given his/her previous experience.
We consider a squared polynomial on age of the political leader and obtain that the effect of age
is inverted U-shaped. This result indicated that the effect is positive but decreasing.
With respect to country variables, we observe that logarithm of GDP per capita lagged one
period and the growth rate of the log GDP per capita exert a positive and statistically significant
effect on the growth rate of the PCRT. On the contrary, the duration of primary education and
democracy has a negative effect on the growth rate of PCRT. This negative effect of duration of
primary indicates that in countries where students have to spend more years in primary education
may also experience higher levels of drop-outs. The negative effect obtained for democratic
countries can be explained by the fact that high levels of schooling are both a prerequisite for
democracy and a major cause of democratization (Lipset, 1959; Barro, 1999; Glaeser et al.,
2004).11 Therefore, democratic countries with higher levels of primary completion rate will have a
lower growth rate compared to non-democratic countries where the educational attainment tend
to be lower.
Concerning our specific research question our results reveal that leaders’ education indeed
affects the education level of population. Model 1 shows that in the annual growth rate of the
PCRT is larger in countries where the leader possesses a college degree. However, this result
could be explained by the fact that in countries more prone to have educated leaders, also exhibit
a structural propensity to experience a higher growth rate of the PCRT. In order to disentangle
this, we also include the impact of both transitions.
Ours results shows that when a positive transition occurs there is an increase in the level
of educational attainment, which means that the performance of leaders ruling with (at least)
college degree is better than their counterparts without higher education. This result supports
the main hypothesis we propose in this study, since the educational attainment of population
increases when the country transitions from a non-educated leader to an educated one compared
to those countries with non-educated leaders all the time.
Other result that supports our hypothesis is that unlike positive transition, we find that tran-
11According to Acemoglu et al. (2005), education is argued to promote democracy both because it enables
a “culture of democracy” to develop and because it leads to greater prosperity, which is also thought to cause
political development.
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sitioning from an educated leader to a less educated one the educational attainment of population
is impacted negatively. We obtain that during the negative transitions, the primary completion
rate experiences a growth reversal comparing to those countries which have educated leader all
period of study.
The statistical significant effect of our two main explanatory variables measuring educational
transitions support the finding with the educational level, showing that more educated leaders
lead to more educated citizens.
Finally, we also report the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, which is a test of the
validity of instrumental variables.12 The Hansen J statistic replaces the Sargan test used in the
original one-step Arellano-Bond estimator, since the Hansen test is robust to heteroskedasticity
or autocorrelation.13 We find that the validity of the instruments is confirmed for all the speci-
fications used, since χ2 statistic is not significant in any model. Alternatively, we also show the
results of the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation AR(1) and AR(2).14 We observe that AR(1)
structure cannot be rejected for estimated models 1 and 2, while the AR(2) structure is rejected
for all of them. The results of these tests indicate that there is no serial correlation between the
first-differenced variables used as instruments and the first differences of the residuals . Therefore,
they are good instruments.15
2.7 Conclusions
In this paper we estimate the effect of educational transitions on the educational attainment
of population during the period 1970-2004. We find that more educated leaders lead to more
educated citizens. We find that the educational attainment of population increases when the
12Under the null hypothesis the statistic follows a chi-square where the degrees of freedom are determined by
the number of instruments used in the estimation.
13See Roodman (2009) for details.
14The null hypothesis is no autocorrelation and is applied to the differenced residuals. The test for AR (1) process
in first differences usually rejects the null hypothesis because ∆εilt is mathematically related to ∆εil,t−1 with which
it shares a εil,t−1 term. So, negative first-order serial correlation is expected in differences and evidence of it is
uninformative. The test for AR (2) in first differences is more important, because it will detect autocorrelation in
levels between the εil,t−1 in ∆εilt and the εil,t−2 in ∆εil,t−2.
15An AR(1) structure implies that serial autocorrelation is removed after one difference, whereas a higher order
structure AR(s), with s≥2, means that a first difference is not enough to remove autocorrelation. Given that
the estimation method used here uses as instruments the first differences, the persistence of this correlation after
applying a first difference would imply that they are endogenous, and hence bad instruments.
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country transitions from a non-educated leader to an educated leader compared to those countries
with non-educated leaders all the time. On the contrary, a negative transition, i.e. from a
highly educated leader to a leader with just secondary education, have a negative impact on
the educational attainment of the population. These findings support the main hypothesis we
propose in this study. We hypothesize that the positive link between the education of the political
leader and the education of the population we find here, is as plausible explanation for the effect
of leader’s education on economic growth found in the previous literature. We contribute to the
literature by providing further evidence in the scant but emerging literature that links leaders’
characteristics with countries’ performance. All this evidence taken together suggests that the
socio-economic background of political leaders may be informative about the type of policies they
can be more sensitive. Therefore, this claims for the convenience of the use of “open lists” in
democratic countries, where voters can decide not only about the party in the government but
also about the individuals in each list.
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Table 2.4: Political Leaders Included in our Sample
Country Leader Deg. Country Leader Deg.
Afghanistan Burhanuddin Rabbani 1 Brunei Darussalam Hassanal Bolkiah 1
Afghanistan Karmal 1 Bulgaria Berov 1
Afghanistan Sardar M. Daud Khan 0 Bulgaria Dimitrov, P. 1
Afghanistan Taraki 0 Bulgaria Kostov 1
Albania Berisha 1 Bulgaria Mladenov 0
Albania Fatos Nano 1 Bulgaria Popov 1
Albania Meta 1 Bulgaria Saksgoburggotski 1
Algeria Benjedid 0 Bulgaria Videnov 1
Algeria Boumedienne 1 Bulgaria Zhivkov 0
Algeria Bouteflika 0 Burkina Faso Campaore 1
Algeria Kafi 0 Burkina Faso Gerard Kango 0
Algeria Zeroual 0 Burkina Faso J. P. Ouedraogo 0
Angola Dos Santos 1 Burkina Faso Lamizana 0
Antigua & Barbuda Bird, Vere Cornwall 0 Burkina Faso Sankara 0
Argentina Eduardo Duhalde 1 Burkina Faso Zerbo 0
Argentina Lanusse 1 Burundi Bagaza 1
Argentina Levingston 1 Burundi Buyoya 1
Argentina Menem 1 Burundi Micombero 1
Argentina Nestor Kirchner 1 Burundi Ndayizeye 1
Argentina Peron, Isabel 0 Cambodia Hun Sen 0
Argentina Videla 1 Cambodia Ranariddh 1
Argentina de la Rua 1 Cameroon Ahidjo 0
Armenia Kocharian 1 Cameroon Biya 1
Armenia Ter-Petrosyan 1 Canada Chretien 1
Austria Klima 1 Cape Verde Neves 1
Austria Kreisky 1 Cape Verde Pires 0
Austria Schussel 1 Cape Verde Veiga 1
Azerbaijan H. Aliyev 1 Central African Rep. Bokassa 0
Azerbaijan Ilhma Aliyev 1 Central African Rep. Dacko 0
Bahamas Ingraham 1 Central African Rep. Francois Bozize 0
Bahrain Hamad I. Al-Khalifah 1 Central African Rep. Kolingba 0
Bahrain Isa Ibn Al-Khalifah 0 Chad Deby 1
Bangladesh Ershad 0 Chad Habre 0
Bangladesh Sattar 1 Chad Malloum 1
Bangladesh Ziaur Rahman 0 Chad Tombalbaye 0
Barbados Arthur 1 Chile Allende 1
Belarus Hryb 0 Chile Frei Montalva 1
Belarus Lukashenko 1 Chile Frei Ruiz-Tagle 1
Belarus Shushkevich 1 Chile Pinochet 1
Belgium Eyskens, M. 1 Chile Ricardo Lagos 1
Belgium Martens 1 China Deng Xiaoping 1
Belgium Tindemans 1 China Jiang Zemin 1
Belize Esquivel 1 Colombia Alvaro Uribe Velez 1
Belize Musa 1 Colombia Arango 1
Benin Ahomadegbe 1 Colombia Barco Vargas, Virgilio 1
Benin Kerekou 1 Colombia Betancur 1
Benin Maga 0 Colombia Lleras Restropo 1
Benin Soglo, Nicephore 0 Colombia Pastrana Borrero 1
Bhutan Lyonpo Jigme Thinley 1 Colombia Pizano 1
Bhutan Lyonpo Sangay Ngedup 1 Colombia Trujillo 1
Bhutan Lyonpo Yeshey Zimba 1 Colombia Turbay 0
Bhutan Wangchuck, Jigme Singye 1 Comoros Abdallah 0
Bolivia Banzer Suarez 1 Comoros Azali Assoumani 1
Bolivia Carlos Mesa 1 Comoros Djohar 1
Bolivia Gonzalo Sanchez 1 Congo, Dem. Rep. Joseph Kabila 0
Bolivia Jorge Quiroga Ramirez 1 Congo, Dem. Rep. Laurent Kabila 1
Bolivia Paz Zamora 1 Congo, Dem. Rep. Mobutu 0
Botswana Khama 1 Congo, Rep. Lissouba 1
Botswana Masire 0 Congo, Rep. Ngouabi 1
Botswana Mogae 1 Congo, Rep. Nguesso 1
Brazil Cardoso 1 Congo, Rep. Opango 1
Brazil Figueiredo 1 Costa Rica Arias 1
Brazil Franco, Itamar 1 Costa Rica Calderon Fournier 1
Brazil Geisel 1 Costa Rica Carazo Odio 1
Brazil Lula da Silva 0 Costa Rica Figueres Ferrer 0
Brazil Medici 1 Costa Rica Figueres Olsen 1
Brazil Mello 1 Costa Rica Monge Alverez 0
Brazil Sarnay 1 Costa Rica Quiros, Daniel 1
Costa Rica Rodriguez Echeverria 1 Fiji Rabuka 1
Costa Rica de la Espriella 1 Finland Halonen 1
Cote d’Ivoire Guei 1 Finland Koivisto 1
Cote d’Ivoire Houphouet-Boigny 1 Finland Marthi Ahtisaari 1
Note: Deg. = 1 if the leader has college education or post-graduate qualification). Continued on next page
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Table 2.4 – continued from previous page
Country Leader Deg. Country Leader Deg.
Cote d’Ivoire Konan Bedie 1 France Chirac 1
Cote d’Ivoire Laurent Gbagbo 1 France Giscard D’Estaing 1
Croatia Mesic 1 France Mitterand 1
Croatia Tudjman 1 France Pompidou 1
Cuba Fidel Castro 1 Gabon Bongo 1
Cyprus Clerides 1 Gambia Jammeh 0
Cyprus Kyprianou 1 Gambia Jawara 1
Cyprus Makarios 1 Georgia Saakashvili 1
Cyprus Tassos N. Papadopoulos 1 Georgia Shevardnadze 1
Cyprus Vassiliou 1 Germany Kohl 1
Czech Rep. Spidla 1 Germany Schroder 1
Czech Rep. V. Klaus 1 Ghana Acheampong 0
Czech Rep. Zeman 1 Ghana Akuffo 1
Denmark Baunsgaard 0 Ghana Busia 1
Denmark Fogh Rasmussen 1 Ghana John Agyekum Kufuor 1
Denmark Hartling 1 Ghana Limann 1
Denmark Jorgensen 0 Ghana Rawlings 1
Denmark Krag 1 Greece A. Papandreou 1
Denmark Nyrup Rasmussen 1 Greece Ionannides 1
Denmark Schluter 1 Greece Karamanlis 1
Djibouti Gouled Aptidon 0 Greece Konstantinos Karamanlis 1
Djibouti Guelleh 0 Greece Mitsotakis 1
Dominica Charles, Eugenia 1 Greece Papadopoulos 1
Dominica Charles, Pierre 1 Greece Rallis 1
Dominica Douglas, Roosevelt 1 Grenada Bishop, Maurice 1
Dominica James, Edison 1 Grenada Blaize, Herbert 0
Dominican Rep. Balaguer 1 Grenada Brathwaite, Nicholas 1
Dominican Rep. Fernandez Reyna 1 Grenada Gairy, Eric 0
Dominican Rep. Guzman Fernandez 0 Grenada Mitchell, Keith 1
Dominican Rep. Hipolito Mejia 1 Guatemala Alfonso Portillo 1
Ecuador Alarcon Fabian 1 Guatemala Arana Osorio 1
Ecuador Duran Ballen 1 Guatemala Arzu Yrigoyen 1
Ecuador Febres Cordaro 1 Guatemala Berger Perdomo 1
Ecuador Gustavo Noboa 1 Guatemala Cerezo 1
Ecuador Hurtado Larrea 1 Guatemala Laugerud Garcia 1
Ecuador Lucio Gutierrez 1 Guatemala Lucas Garcia 1
Ecuador Mahuad 1 Guatemala Mejia Victores 1
Ecuador Poveda Burbano 1 Guatemala Rios Montt 1
Ecuador Rodriguez Lara 1 Guinea Conte 1
Ecuador Roldos Aquilers 1 Guinea Toure 0
Ecuador Velasco Ibarra 1 Guinea-Bissau Cabral 0
Egypt, Arab Rep. Mubarak 1 Guinea-Bissau Kumba Iala 1
Egypt, Arab Rep. Sadat 0 Guinea-Bissau Sanha 1
El Salvador Calderon Sol 1 Guinea-Bissau Vieira 0
El Salvador Cristiani 1 Guyana Bharrat Jagdeo 1
El Salvador Duarte 1 Guyana Burnham 1
El Salvador Flores, Francisco 1 Guyana Hoyte 1
El Salvador Magana Borjo 1 Guyana Jagan Cheddi 1
El Salvador Molina 1 Guyana Janet Jagan 1
El Salvador Romero Mena 1 Guyana Samuel Hinds 1
El Salvador Saca González 0 Haiti Duvalier, Jean- 0
El Salvador Sanchez Hernandez 0 Haiti Namphy 0
Equatorial Guinea Nguema Mbasogo 1 Haiti Preval 1
Eritrea Afeworki 0 Honduras Callejas 1
Estonia Kallas 1 Honduras Paz Garcia 0
Estonia Laar 1 Honduras Reina 1
Estonia Parts 1 Honduras Suazo Cordova 1
Estonia Siimann 1 Hungary Antall 1
Estonia Vahi 1 Hungary Grosz 0
Ethiopia Meles Zenawi 0 Hungary Horn 1
Ethiopia Mengistu Marriam 1 Hungary Kadar 0
Fiji Chaudhry 0 Hungary Orban 1
Fiji Laisenia Qarase 1 Hungary Peter Medgyessy 1
Fiji Mara 1 Iceland Oddsson 1
India Gandhi, I. 1 Lao PDR Phomivan 1
India Gandhi, R. 1 Lao PDR Phounsavanh 1
India Manmohan Singh 1 Lao PDR Siphandon 0
India Rao 1 Latvia Berzins 1
India Vajpayee 1 Latvia Gailis 1
Indonesia Megawati Sukarnoputri 0 Latvia Indulis Emsis 1
Indonesia Suharto 0 Latvia Kristopans 1
Indonesia Wahid 1 Latvia Repse 1
Iran, Islamic Rep. Ayatollah Khomeini 0 Latvia Skele 1
Note: Deg. = 1 if the leader has college education or post-graduate qualification). Continued on next page
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Table 2.4 – continued from previous page
Country Leader Deg. Country Leader Deg.
Iran, Islamic Rep. Khatami 1 Lebanon Elias Hrawi 1
Iran, Islamic Rep. Mohammad Reza 0 Lebanon Emile Lahoud 1
Iran, Islamic Rep. Rafsanjani 1 Lesotho Jonathan 0
Iraq Hassan Al-Bakr 0 Lesotho Lekhanya 0
Iraq Iyad Allawi 1 Lesotho Mokhehle 1
Iraq Saddam Hussein 1 Lesotho Mosisili 1
Ireland Ahern 1 Lesotho Ramaema 0
Ireland Bruton 1 Liberia Tolbert 1
Ireland Reynolds 1 Libya Qaddafi 1
Israel Ariel Sharon 0 Lithuania Adamkus 1
Italy Amato 1 Lithuania Brazauskas 1
Italy Andreotti 1 Lithuania Paksas 1
Italy Berlusconi 1 Luxembourg Thorn G. 1
Italy Colombo 1 Luxembourg Werner 1
Italy Cossiga 1 Macedonia, FYR Crvenkovski 1
Italy Craxi 1 Macedonia, FYR Georgievski 1
Italy D’Alema 0 Macedonia, FYR Hari Kostov 1
Italy Dini 1 Madagascar Marc Ravalomanana 0
Italy Fanfani 1 Madagascar Ramanantsoa 1
Italy Goria 1 Madagascar Ratsiraka 1
Italy Mita 1 Madagascar Tsiranana 0
Italy Moro 1 Madagascar Zafy 1
Italy Prodi 1 Malawi Banda 1
Italy Rumor 1 Malawi Bingu wa Mutharika 1
Italy Spadolini 1 Malawi Muluzi 1
Jamaica Manley 1 Malaysia Ahmad Badawi 1
Jamaica Patterson 1 Malaysia Hussein Bin Onn 1
Jamaica Seaga 1 Malaysia Mahatir B. Mohammad 1
Japan Fukuda 1 Malaysia Razak 1
Japan Hashimoto 1 Mali Amadou Toure 1
Japan Kaifu 1 Mali Konare 1
Japan Miki 1 Mali Traore 0
Japan Miyazawa 1 Malta Adami 1
Japan Murayama 1 Malta Bonnici 1
Japan Nakasone 1 Malta Mintoff 1
Japan Ohira 1 Malta Sant 1
Japan Sato 1 Marshall Islands Kabua, Imata 1
Japan Suzuki 0 Marshall Islands Note, Kessai 1
Japan Takeshita 1 Mauritania Ould Ahmed Louly 0
Japan Tanaka 0 Mauritania Ould Daddah 1
Jordan Abdullah I. H. 1 Mauritania Ould Haidalla 0
Jordan Hussein I. T. 0 Mauritania Sidi Ahmed Taya 0
Kazakhstan Nazarbaev 0 Mauritius Anerood Jugnauth 1
Kenya Kenyatta 1 Mauritius Ramgoolam N. 1
Kenya Moi 0 Mexico Echeverria Alvarez 1
Kenya Mwai Kibaki 1 Mexico Lopez Portillo 1
Kiribati Tabai, Ieremia 1 Mexico Salinas 1
Kiribati Teannaki, Teatao 1 Mexico Vicente Fox 1
Kiribati Tito, Teburoro 1 Mexico Zedillo 1
Korea, Rep. Choi Kuy Hay 1 Mexico de La Madrid 1
Korea, Rep. Chun Doo Hwan 1 Moldova Lucinschi 1
Korea, Rep. Hee Park 1 Moldova Snegur 1
Korea, Rep. Kim Dae Jung 0 Moldova Tarlev 1
Korea, Rep. Kim Young Sam 1 Mongolia Bagabandi 1
Korea, Rep. Roh Moo Hyun 1 Mongolia Ochirbat 1
Korea, Rep. Roh Tae Woo 1 Mongolia Tsedenbal 1
Kuwait Jabir As-Sabah 0 Morocco Hassan II 1
Kuwait Sabah As-Sabah 0 Morocco Muhammad VI 1
Kyrgyz Rep. Akayev 1 Mozambique Chissano 0
Mozambique Machel 0 Portugal Caetano 1
Myanmar Ne Win 0 Portugal Costa Gomes 1
Myanmar Than Shwe 0 Portugal Spinola 1
Namibia Nujoma 0 Qatar Ahmed Ath-Thani 1
Nepal Birendra 1 Qatar Amad Al Thani 1
Nepal Gyanendra B. B. 1 Qatar Khalifah Ath-Thani 1
Netherlands Biesheuvel 1 Romania A. Nastase 1
Netherlands Kok 1 Romania Ciorbea 1
Netherlands Lubbers 1 Romania Isarescu 1
Netherlands den Uyl 1 Romania Roman 1
Netherlands van Agt 1 Romania Vacariou 1
New Zealand Holyoake 0 Romania Vasile 1
New Zealand Kirk 0 Russian Federation Putin 1
New Zealand Marshall 1 Russian Federation Yeltsin 1
Note: Deg. = 1 if the leader has college education or post-graduate qualification). Continued on next page
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Table 2.4 – continued from previous page
Country Leader Deg. Country Leader Deg.
New Zealand Muldoon 0 Rwanda Habyarimana 1
New Zealand Rowling 1 Rwanda Kayibanda 0
Nicaragua Aleman 1 Rwanda Paul Kagame 1
Nicaragua Anastasio Somoza D. 1 Sao Tome & Principe Manuel Pinto 0
Nicaragua Daniel Ortega 0 Sao Tome & Principe Miguel Trovoada 1
Nicaragua Enrique Bolanos 1 Saudi Arabia Khalid 0
Nicaragua Violeta Chamorro 0 Senegal Abdoulaye Wade 1
Niger Diori 0 Senegal Diouf 1
Niger Kountche 1 Senegal Senghor 1
Niger Mainassara 0 Seychelles James R. Mancham 1
Niger Mamadou 0 Seychelles France Albert Rene 1
Niger Ousmane 1 Sierra Leone Stevens 1
Niger Seibou 0 Slovak Rep. Dzurinda 1
Niger Wanke 1 Slovak Rep. Meciar 1
Nigeria Obasanjo 0 Slovak Rep. Moravcik 1
Norway Bondevik 1 Slovenia Anton Rop 1
Norway Bratteli 0 Slovenia Bajuk 1
Norway Brundtland 1 Slovenia Drnovsek 1
Norway Korvald 1 South Africa Mandela 1
Norway Nordli 1 South Africa Mbeki 1
Norway Stoltenberg 1 South Africa deKlerk 1
Norway Syse 1 Spain Calvo-Sotelo 1
Norway Willoch 1 Spain Gonzalez Marquez 1
Oman Qabus Bin Said 1 Spain Rodriguez Zapatero 1
Panama Balladares 1 Sri Lanka Bandaranaike, S 0
Panama Dario Paredes 1 Sri Lanka Jayewardene 1
Panama Mireya Moscoso 1 Sri Lanka Kumaratunga 1
Panama Noriega 0 Sri Lanka Premadasa 0
Panama Torrijos Herrera 0 St. Kitts & Nevis Douglas, Denzil 1
Papua New Guinea Chan 1 St. Kitts & Nevis Simmonds, Kennedy A. 1
Papua New Guinea Morauta 1 St. Lucia Anthony, Kenny 1
Papua New Guinea Namaliu 1 St. Lucia Compton, John G. M. 1
Papua New Guinea Skate 1 Sudan Al-Bashir 1
Papua New Guinea Wingti 1 Sudan Nimeiri 1
Paraguay Gonzalez Macchi 1 Swaziland Dzeliwe Shongwe 0
Paraguay Nicanor Duarte Frutos 1 Swaziland Mswati 0
Paraguay Rodriguez Pedotti 1 Swaziland Ntombe Thwala 0
Paraguay Stroessner 1 Swaziland Subhuza II 0
Paraguay Wasmosy Monti 1 Sweden Bildt, C. 1
Peru Alejandro Toledo 1 Sweden Carlsson 1
Peru Belaunde 1 Sweden Falldin 0
Peru Fujimori 1 Sweden Palme 1
Peru Morales Bermudez 1 Sweden Persson 0
Peru Valentin Paniagua 1 Sweden Ullsten 1
Peru Velasco Alvarado 1 Syrian Arab Rep. Al-Assad H. 1
Philippines Aquino 1 Syrian Arab Rep. Bashar al-Assad 1
Philippines Estrada 0 Tajikistan Rakhmonov 1
Philippines Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 1 Tanzania Mkapa 1
Philippines Marcos 1 Tanzania Mwinyi 1
Poland Gierek 0 Tanzania Nyerere 1
Poland Jaruzelski 0 Thailand Kriangsak 1
Poland Kania 0 Thailand Kukrot Pramoj 1
Poland Kwasniewski 1 Thailand Leekpai 1
Poland Walesa 0 Thailand Prem 1
Thailand Seni Pramoj 1 United States Clinton 1
Thailand Thanin Kraivichien 1 United States G.W. Bush 1
Togo Eyadema 0 Uruguay Bordaberry 0
Tonga Taufaáhau Tupou IV 1 Uruguay Jorge Batlle 1
Trinidad & Tobago Chambers 0 Uruguay Lacalle de Herrera 1
Trinidad & Tobago Manning 1 Uruguay Mendez Manfredini 1
Trinidad & Tobago Panday 1 Uruguay Pacheco Areco 0
Trinidad & Tobago Robinson 1 Uruguay Sanguinetti 1
Tunisia Ben Ali Bourguiba 1 Uzbekistan Karimov 1
Tunisia Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali 1 Venezuela Andres Perez 0
Turkey Akbulut 1 Venezuela Caldera Rodriguez 1
Turkey Ciller 1 Venezuela Campins 1
Turkey Demirel 1 Venezuela Hugo Chavez 1
Turkey Erdogan 1 Venezuela Lusinchi 1
Turkey Ozal 1 Vietnam Le Duan 0
Uganda Amin, Idi 0 Vietnam Nong Duc Manh 1
Uganda Banaisa 1 Vietnam Phieu 1
Uganda Museveni 1 Zambia Chiluba 1
Uganda Obote 0 Zambia Kaunda 0
Note: Deg. = 1 if the leader has college education or post-graduate qualification). Continued on next page
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Table 2.4 – continued from previous page
Country Leader Deg. Country Leader Deg.
Ukraine Kravchuk 1 Zambia Levy Mwanawasa 1
Ukraine Kuchma 1 Zimbabwe Mugabe 1
United Arab Emirates An-Nahayan 0
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Note: Figure (a) shows the Primary Completion Rate across countries (1970-2004). Figure (b) displays the proportion of leaders with
at least college degree across countries (1970-2004). Comparing (a) and (b), we observe that those countries with higher proportion
of educated leaders have higher completion rates. Source: own elaboration.
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Impact of Duration of Primary Education on School Enrollment,
Graduation and Drop-outs: A Cross-Country Analysis
3.1 Introduction
The acquisition of education is a significant and indivisible investment, where individuals incur in
costs at the present time in return for rewards in the future. Consequently, individual schooling
attainment is largely constrained by family resources and influenced by factors affecting the costs
and benefits to households of sending children to school. For developing and underdeveloped
countries, parental preferences play a crucial role in these schooling decisions, since families have
to choose between sending children to work or keeping them in the school (Bursztyn and Coffman,
2012). Hence, costs to the family include not only the direct costs of school attendance but also
the opportunity cost, namely, foregone earnings of time spent in school instead of in alternative
productive activities.
Since the relative costs incurred by families can constitute an impediment to acquiring educa-
tion because of the presence of borrowing constraints, mainly in developing countries, empirical
evidence suggests a direct link between schooling costs and school attendance. For example, some
of them report dramatic increases in school enrollment with initiatives to eliminate school fees
(Kremer, 2003) and to reduce costs associated with accessing schooling (Kremer et al., 1997;
Duflo, 2001). However, to the best of our knowledge, previous studies do not pay attention to the
57
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ESSAYS ON HUMAN CAPITAL 
Jessica Helen Pérez Reynosa 




implications of the opportunity cost which is an important factor influencing the decision to send
children to school, specially in developing countries.1 One reason why families might choose not
to send children to school is low perceived returns of attending school (Edmonds and Pavcnik,
2005).
In this context, an increase in the duration of primary education makes enrollment decision
more difficult for parents and foregone earnings to have a greater say in the decision. Educational
reforms that a government can carry out in order to delay leaving school can be translated into
both, an increase in direct expenditures on tuition, books or transportation and in the opportunity
cost by staying an extra year in primary school, especially affecting students from a certain age
that may have the option to work. Thus, a reform in the number of years an individual must
spend in the school system could imply an increase in the drop-out rate (or decrease in school
enrollment in the following educational level, i.e., secondary), since an additional year not only
involves a greater allocation of resources to education by government but also by families. On
one hand, schools are required to deal with a significantly enlarged student body and this can
create logistical problems with staff and classroom numbers. On the other hand, families “loose”
another economically active member for one more year. The latter is especially problematic if
family income is near to a subsistence level.
Considering that from a empirical point of view little is known on the extent to which a
reform of the number of years (grades) of schooling could have an impact in terms of attendance
for primary and secondary education, the aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of duration of
primary education, which is compulsory in most of the countries, on school enrollment, graduation
and drop-out rates. We use enrollment rates given that student attendance in school is a key
indicator of whether countries or regions are improving educational systems and also, are good
proxies for measuring school quality.
In our study we exclude developed countries since they use other mechanism in order to avoid
drop-outs and parent’s decision of sending children to school is based on different criteria to
that of developing and underdeveloped countries, where child labor is more common. We focus
on developing and underdeveloped countries where the context is different and the opportunity
cost for families can be substantial because most of working children are employed by their
1The literature analyzing the impact of the opportunity cost is mainly focused on high school graduates who
face the decision to enroll in college or get a job (Hansen, 1963; Catsiapis, 1987; Cameron and Taber, 2004).
Therefore, students are who plan their investment in education, contrary to what is considered in this paper where
parents are the decision makers.
58
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ESSAYS ON HUMAN CAPITAL 
Jessica Helen Pérez Reynosa 




parents (especially in rural areas) rather than in manufacturing establishments or other forms
of wage employment (Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2005). Furthermore, empirical evidence supports
the importance of borrowing constraints for developing countries affecting children’s progression
through the primary school system and cause them to withdraw from school earlier (Jacoby, 1994).
Although education is compulsory and free for almost all children, the law in these countries is
loosely enforced.2
Using cross-country panel data covering the period 1970-2012, we find that for children in
elementary school one additional grade of primary education have a negative impact on the
enrollment rate, while the effect on drop-outs is positive. We also observe that an additional year
(grade) in primary education reduces the enrollment rate in secondary education. These results
are in line with fertility models and indicate that families in developing and underdeveloped
countries do not have incentive to educate their children, because they need them for providing
resources to the household. Therefore, to the extent that children represent a high economic
value and families face the decision to invest in their education or send them to work and gain
from their earnings in a setting of borrowing constraints, policies increasing the duration of
primary education may not have the desired effect as in developed countries. Although previous
literature provides evidence that increasing compulsory schooling in developed countries have
positive returns in terms of earnings and non-pecuniary outcomes (school externalities), this may
not apply for developing and underdeveloped countries where children earnings are one component
of the household income and in many cases represent the support of the entire family.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides the conceptual
framework of our study. Section 3.3 presents an overview of related literature. Section 3.4
describes the econometric strategy and data. Section 3.5 presents the empirical results. Finally
in Section 3.6, we discuss our main findings.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
Schooling decisions occur largely while the person is still a child and living with her parents. From
the theoretical point of view, the standard approaches for schooling decisions consider either a
2For instance, in Brazil “...Although working is only legal at the age of 16, over 15 percent of 15-year-old
children from the bottom quartile households in the income distribution were not enrolled in school in 2006, and
over 22 percent reported having a job during the week they were interviewed for the 2006 PNAD...” (Bursztyn
and Coffman, 2012, p. 365)
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single decision-maker, parents making the decision for their children or dynasties with unified
utility functions. Ota and Moffatt (2007) identifies three broad approaches to the modeling of
the determinants of children’s schooling: human capital investment model, demographic models
and fertility decision models.
The first approach is the human capital investment model, parents are assumed to make the
decision by maximizing their lifetime utility which depends on consumption in two periods, subject
to an inter-temporal budget constraint.3 This model is often used to explain the lower school
enrollment for girls than for boys (see Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985; Haddad et al., 1997).
Since the choice between schooling and work is assumed to be made by an individual agent, the
effect of the household situation, particularly those of an individual child’s position within the
household, are not fully taken into account.
The second approach is that of demographic models. These establish link between the de-
mographic characteristics of a child (e.g. number of siblings, birth order) and their educational
attainment (as measured by test scores, completed years of schooling or earnings). In these mod-
els, two theories are tested. The first is the “resource dilution effect” which predicts that the more
children there are in the household, the lower the educational quality, since the resources of the
household, in terms of both material resources and parents’ attention, are diluted. The second
theory, the “teaching effect”, predicts that the presence of siblings has a positive influence on
educational achievement through the benefit of either teaching younger siblings or being taught
by older siblings. Empirical studies which include the number of children in the household as
an explanatory factor tend to support the resource dilution effect, which is also suggested by
the fertility decision model. However, when birth order is included as a variable, the results are
mixed for both resource dilution and teaching effects (see Kessler, 1991; Travis and Kohli, 1995).
Using data from Peru, Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997) find that having a greater number
of younger siblings implies less schooling, more age-grade distortion in the classroom and more
child labor. Related studies are Knodel et al. (1990) and Knodel and Wongsith (1991).4
The third approach, fertility decision model, is precisely the conceptual framework we adopt in
this paper. This model is based on household production models and assumes that high fertility
in developing countries results from the high perceived economic value of children and investigates
3In the first period, they either invest in children’s education or send them to work and gain from their earnings.
In the second period, parents become economically inactive and rely on the economic support of their children,
whose incomes depend on educational level.
4These literature is framed into the demographic approach.
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what drives a transition in parents’ preference of children. Following from this theoretical contri-
bution some empirical work has been undertaken. These studies typically examine a household’s
joint decision on how many children to have; how children’s time is allocated between schooling,
wage work and family work; and how resources are distributed among household members (see
e.g. De Tray, 1980; Mueller, 1984). This approach can be used to identify which types of house-
hold are more likely to choose to educate their children, particularly to the case of the schooling
choice in rural areas. Our paper can be framed in this third approach.
3.3 Literature Review
A large literature investigates the causal effect of years of compulsory schooling (either primary or
secondary) on pecuniary and non-pecuniary outcomes. Using compulsory laws as an instrument
to analyze this effect, several papers have consistently documented gains to adult outcomes from
an additional year of schooling in developed countries. In terms of earnings, Angrist and Krueger
(1991) and Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) using data from United States (U.S.), estimate that
annual adult earnings are about 10 percent higher for students compelled to stay a year longer in
compulsory education. Harmon and Walker (1995) and Oreopoulos (2006) find about 14 percent
higher earnings from school compulsion in the United Kingdom. Regarding non-pecuniary out-
comes (schooling externalities), Lochner and Moretti (2004) estimate that compulsory schooling
in U.S. lowers the likelihood of committing crime or ending up in jail. Black et al. (2004) find that
compulsory schooling reduces the chances of teen pregnancy in the U.S. and Norway. Meanwhile,
Lleras-Muney (2005) estimates an additional year of compulsory schooling substantially lowers
the probability of dying among elderly people in the United States.
Despite of the fact that there is an extensive literature that addresses the issue of the impact
of an additional year of schooling on future outcomes in the long-run (earnings or lifetime wealth),
previous papers have not yet considered which is the effect in the short-run in terms of school
attendance and drop-outs. As far as we are aware, this paper is the first analyzing the potential
effect of the changes in the duration of primary education on school enrollment, graduation and
drop-out rates.5
5Most related to our work, Krashinsky (2006) studies the effect of elimination of the fifth year of high school in
Ontario, Canada on academic performance in first-year university courses. He finds that cohorts with four years
of high school had substantially lower grade point averages in college than those who attended high school for five
years.
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Since education involves an investment decision, an additional year of schooling implies some
cost for both, families and government. Empirical research in this field links schooling decisions
with both direct or indirect costs of sending children to school. As pointed out earlier, the direct
costs of schooling include school fees, books, uniforms and commuting costs. Some studies have
found a direct link between these directs schooling costs and school attendance. Kremer et al.
(1997) evaluate a randomized intervention providing uniforms to students who would otherwise
need to pay for uniforms in Kenya. After five years, students with the free uniforms had completed
15 percent more schooling. Also, the drop-out rate was 6.8 percent at program schools, and 16.5
percent in comparison schools. The analysis suggests that reducing school fees would reduce
drop-out rates. In a related study, Deininger (2003) evaluates the impact of “Universal Primary
Education” program in Uganda which dispensed with fees for primary enrollment. He finds that
a dramatic increase in primary school attendance and a substantial reduction in inequalities in
attendance related to gender, income, and region were associated with the program.
The indirect schooling costs, such as the costs associated with accessing schooling, may also
be important. Duflo (2001) finds a large increase in schooling attainment accompanying a school
construction program in Indonesia that would have lowered the commuting costs of schooling
dramatically. For Mexico, Schultz (2004) examine the impact on school enrollment of a school
subsidy program in poor rural communities in Mexico called Progresa. He finds an average increase
in enrollment of 3.4 percent for all students in grades 1 through 8; the increase was largest among
girls who had completed grade 6, at 14.8 percent.6 Another relevant indirect cost of schooling is
foregone income of the child while going to school. Households may also be forced to keep children
away from school because their income is close to the subsistence level. In Becker’s (1965) model
of household production and consumption, the opportunity cost of an individual’s time is the
marginal value of her or his output in alternative valued activities at home or family business,
such as farming. Thus, for these families if the net return to human capital investment is too low
compared to investment in other assets, children may be sent to work instead of attending school.
Jacoby (1994) investigates the effect of borrowing constraints by looking at how quickly children,
with different family backgrounds, progress through the primary school system in Peru. In the
Model, children from very high income households or with very low (initial) opportunity costs
attend school full-time for essentially their entire educational careers. But, children with a high
opportunity cost relative to household income may start school with only part-time attendance.
6See Kremer, 2003 for a summarize of evaluations of educational programs in developing countries.
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He empirically finds that children start withdrawing from school earlier in households with lower
income and durable good holdings and when children are more closely spaced.
3.4 Empirical Strategy and Data
3.4.1 Empirical Model
To evaluate and test the link between the duration of primary education and various educational
outcomes such as school enrollment and drop-outs rate, we use a panel data of non OECD
countries covering the period 1970-2012 and estimate the following linear model:
yit = α +DURPRIMitγ + Xitβ + µi + εit; (3.1)
where yit is the educational outcome in country i at time t; Xit is a matrix containing a
set of covariates; µi is a country fixed-effect that allows us to control for country’s unobserved
heterogeneity (such as history and culture that might affect global macro-trends such as rising
levels of educational attainment); εit is a time-varying error term, and α, γ and β are a set of
parameters to be estimated. DURPRIMit refers to the duration of primary education in country
i at time t. In these equation, our main coefficient of interest is γ, which picks-up the effect
of the duration of primary education on the level of enrollment and drop-outs. Equation 3.1 is
estimated using a linear fixed-effect panel data model.
Since we are mainly interested in analyzing the impact of policies changing the duration of
primary education, we also consider changes in the level of these outcomes and inputs. Equa-
tion 3.2 explains the impact of reforms aimed at changing the duration of primary education on
educational outcomes of the population:
∆yit = α + yit−1δ + ∆DURPRIMitγ + ∆Xitβ + µi + εit; (3.2)
In both equations, our outcome variables (yit) are the school enrollment rate in primary
and secondary education, and the completion rate and drop-outs rate in primary education. In
Equation 3.2, we include the endogenous variable lagged one period (yi,t−1) since the speed of
growth in the explained variable depends on the level of this variable the previous year, i.e, those
countries that have higher enrollment rates at t− 1 will grow at a lower rate from t− 1 to t.
By construction, yi,t−1 is correlated with the error term, which generates a severe problem of
endogeneity. In addition, the estimation of Equation 3.2 may present other econometric problems
63
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ESSAYS ON HUMAN CAPITAL 
Jessica Helen Pérez Reynosa 




such as the country-specific effect and the presence of non-strictly exogenous variables. In order
to overcome these problems, the strategy used to estimate this equation is the following. First, by
differencing the equation the country-specific effect µi is removed. However, differencing means
that even strictly exogenous variables can become endogenous, in addition to the presence of
non-strictly exogenous variables. Therefore, our core specifications will include not only corre-
lated and heteroskedastic residuals, but also non-strictly exogenous and endogenous variables as
covariates. In this context, a fixed-effects model with the Newey–West corrected covariance ma-
trix provides consistent estimates of the standard errors in the presence of serial correlation and
heteroskedasticity in the residuals. However, the presence of endogenous covariates creates severe
identification problems in the econometric estimation that in turn lead to inconsistent estimate
of the model. To deal with this problem, we use a variant of the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM
estimator. More specifically, we compute a two-step GMM estimator which provides consistent
and robust parameters to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.7 However, the two-step es-
timator computes standard errors that are downward bias. In order to fix this, we apply the
finite-sample correction of the two-step covariance matrix proposed in Windmeijer (2005).
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on whether the lagged values of the explana-
tory variables are valid instruments in the regression and the error term is not serially correlated.
The validity of these assumptions is addressed by using different specification tests. For the va-
lidity of the instruments, we use the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions where the null
hypothesis is the joint validity of the instruments.8 The Hansen J statistic replaces the Sargan
test used in the original one-step Arellano-Bond estimator, since the Hansen test is robust to
heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation.9 In order to test the hypothesis of the absence of first and
second-order serial correlation in the first differenced residuals, we use the Arellano-Bond test for
autocorrelation.
3.4.2 Data
The empirical analysis draws on a variety of datasets. We assemble a database that contains
information on population’s educational attainment at country level, income per capita and other
country characteristics. We use World Bank data which provides various measures on educational
7See Roodman (2009) for details.
8Under the null hypothesis the statistic follows a chi-square where the degrees of freedom are determined by
the number of instruments used in the estimation.
9See Roodman (2009) for details.
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outcomes (completion rates, drop-outs and enrollment rates) at country level, per capita income
and composition of the population.10 Polity IV data provides a measure of democracy.
Our outcome variables are completion, drop-out and enrollment rates which are useful for
comparative research. Primary Completion Rate (PCRT ) is the total number of new entrants
in the last grade of primary education, regardless of age, expressed as percentage of the total
population of the theoretical entrance age to the last grade of primary.11 Drop-out rate in pri-
mary school are the students or pupils who leave school definitively in a given school year, as a
percentage of all students enrolled in primary school.
Gross enrollment ratios are defined as the total number of children enrolled in a level (primary
or secondary education), regardless of age, divided by the population of the age group that
officially corresponds to the same level. Gross enrollment ratios can exceed one-hundred percent
due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late school entrance
and grade repetition. Net enrollment ratios are calculated as the ratio of children of the official
school age who are enrolled in a particular educational level (primary or secondary education) to
the total population of the same age group.
The covariates we consider are the following. Duration of primary is the number of grades
(years) required to complete primary education. This is our variable of interest. As controls for
country characteristics we include the level of the GDP per capita lagged one period, and its
annual growth. These two variables allows to control for differences in income across countries.
Following previous authors, we also include a measure of Democracy, which is a dummy variable
(Persson and Tabellini, 2009; Besley et al., 2011). Finally, as a control for urban bias of access to
education, we include the percentage of urban population. We include this control since children
living in rural areas are less likely to be enrolled in school (Deininger, 2003).
Table 3.2 shows summary statistics of these variables. In our sample of non-OECD countries,
on average, the primary completion rate is 73.22% and the drop-out rate is about 34 %. Net and
gross enrollment rate in primary education are 94.74% and 79.62%, respectively. For secondary
education data, on average, the net enrollment rate is 53.19% and the gross enrollment is 51.97%.
The duration of primary education is about 6 years. In about 41% of the country-year observations
the regime is democratic. On average, the percentage of urban population is about 46%.
10Education data comes from wbopendata available in Stata developed by Azevedo (2011).
11The ratio can exceed one-hundred percent due to over-aged and under-aged children who enter primary school
late/early and/or repeat grades.
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Table 3.3 reports the results of the estimation of our core model in levels (Equation 3.1) for all our
educational outcomes. This model is estimated using a linear panel fixed-effect model. We start
by discussing the results of our variable of interest, that is, duration of primary education. We
observe that the parameter associated to this variable turns out to be statistically significant and
negative for primary the completion rate, but positive for the primary drop-out rate. This result
indicates that for countries where duration of primary education is longer, the completion rate in
primary education is lower, while the drop-out rate is higher. Regarding secondary education, we
obtain that the link between duration of primary education and enrollment rate is statistically
significant and negative, which means that those countries where duration of primary is longer,
the enrollment rate in secondary education (gross and net) is lower. As we will explain later in
more detail, these findings are in line with the fertility model approach mentioned in Section 3.2.
With respect to the remaining covariates, they behave as expected. Those factors that have
a positive link with enrollment and graduation rates, exhibit a negative link with dropouts. We
observe that those countries where the GDP per capita is higher, the completion rate in primary
education and the enrollment rate in secondary education is also higher; but the drop-out rate is
lower. One common hypothesis is that credit constraints limit the investment of the poor in their
children’s education (Schultz, 2004). Children from very low income households or with a high
opportunity cost relative to household income may have lower attendance rate (Jacoby, 1994).
Thus, countries with higher income levels will have higher levels of educational attainment and
lower levels of drop-outs.
Similarly, we find that countries with a higher percentage of people living in urban areas
have higher levels of completion rates in primary education, as well as higher levels of enrollment
in primary and secondary education. This is explained by the fact that people living in rural
areas, which may imply higher commuting costs, have limited access to resources and a lower
concentration of schools compared to those people in urban areas, where the infrastructure tends
to be concentrated. For that reason, a higher percentage of people living in urban areas also
implies lower levels of drop-outs in primary education, which is consistent with previous findings
on the literature analyzing borrowing constraints and access to school in rural areas where children
are employed by their parents to work on the family farm (Schultz, 2004). For countries where the
political regimen is democratic, we also observe that completion rates in primary education and
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enrollment rates are higher, while the drop-out rate is lower. A common view, is that democratic
countries have higher levels of educational attainment compared to non-democratic countries
where the educational levels tend to be lower (Lipset, 1959; Barro, 1999; Glaeser et al., 2004)
In Table 3.4 we report the results of our model in differences (Equation 3.2). In this table
we focus on the impact of reforms on primary educational outcomes. We estimate the model
using a linear panel fixed-effects model and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). We
begin by discussing the results of our variable of interest, i.e, the changes in the duration of
primary education. Our results indicates that changes in the duration of primary education
exert a statistically significant and negative impact on the annual growth in the completion and
enrollment rates in primary education. Analogously, we also observe that the annual growth rate
of drop-out significantly increases if the duration of primary education is lasted. These results are
in line with fertility models and remain robust to different specifications and estimation methods.
In a setting such as developing and underdeveloped countries where the children are perceived as
a high economic value, the cost of schooling is predominantly the opportunity cost of the time a
student withdraws from other activities (working) to attend school.
The remaining of the covariates also behave according to expectations. An increase in the
percentage of urban population, increases the completion rate in primary education and reduces
drop-outs. The growth rate of the logarithm of GDP per capita turns out to be statistically sig-
nificant and positive for the growth in the completion and enrollment rates in primary education;
while its impact on the drop-outs growth rate turns out to be negative. These results indicate that
countries increasing their income level experience an increase in completion and enrollment rates
in primary education, and a decrease in drop-outs. This means that improving the country’s
economic situation will turn in a decrease in children’s contribution to family income because
most working children live in low-income countries.
Our results indicates that laggard countries in terms of educational achievement tend to
experience a greater growth rate, since we find a significant and negative effect of the initial value
of our outcomes variables for all specifications. This means that those countries that have higher
levels of primary enrollment rates will grow at a lower rate than those countries that have lower
levels of primary enrollment rates in t−1, and so on. This result is consistent in all the alternative
models, fixed-effects and GMM.
In models using the GMM estimator, we report the results of the Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions on the validity of the instruments, and the Arellano-Bond test of first
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and second order autocorrelation.12 While autocorrelation of first order prevails by definition,
the null hypothesis of second-order autocorrelation must be rejected in order to get consistent
estimators. In all models in Table 3, we find that the validity of the instruments is confirmed
in all the specifications, since χ2 statistic is not statistically significant in any model. For the
autocorrelation test, we observe that AR(1) structure cannot be rejected in any of the estimated
models, while the AR(2) structure is rejected in all of them. The results of both tests indicate
that there is no serial correlation between the first-differenced variables used as instruments and
the first differences of the residuals εit. Therefore, they are good instruments.
Table 3.5 presents the results of the estimation of our model in differences (Equation 1) for
secondary education. This model explains the impact of changes in the duration of primary
education on the enrollment rate of secondary education (gross and net). As in Table 3.4, we
estimate this model using the linear panel fixed-effect model and the Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM). Results regarding secondary education are in line with those obtained for
primary education, that is, increasing the duration of primary education reduces the gross and
net enrollment rates in secondary education. It applies the same reasoning as in the case of
primary education. However, we consider that for secondary education the effect is easier to
interpret because children are closer to the legal age to work, so their economic value is even
higher than when they are in the age of attending primary education. As in Table 3.4, the
remaining of the covariates provide the same quantitative and qualitative results.
In Table 3.5 we also find that the validity of the instruments is confirmed in all the specifica-
tions. Regarding the autocorrelation tests, we observe that AR(1) structure cannot be rejected
in any of the estimated models, while the AR(2) structure is rejected in all of them. The results
of both tests confirms the consistency of the GMM estimation.
3.6 Conclusions
Using a panel data for non-OECD countries covering the period 1970-2012, we analyze the impact
of the duration of primary education on school enrollment, drop-out and completion rates. Our
results show that for children in elementary school, one additional grade of primary education have
a negative impact on the enrollment rate, while the effect on drop-outs is positive. Analogously, we
obtain that an additional grade in primary education also reduces the enrollment rate in secondary
education. Results stemming from this paper are in line with the fertility model approach, that
12The null hypothesis is no autocorrelation and is applied to the differenced residuals.
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is, in developing and underdeveloped countries parents do not have incentive to send children
to school given the high perceived economic value of children. Thus, an increase in duration of
primary education discourages their continuation in the education system. Our results indicate
that this reasoning applies to both primary and secondary education.
Although previous literature provides evidence that increasing compulsory schooling in devel-
oped countries have positive returns in terms of earnings and non-pecuniary outcomes (school
externalities), this will not apply for developing and underdeveloped countries where children
earnings are an important component of the household income and in many cases represent the
support of the entire family. Therefore, policies consisting in lasting the duration of primary
education, which have been proved to be successful in developed countries, may fail in developing
and underdeveloped countries since it might have an undesired impact on children educational
outcomes (enrollment, graduation or drop-outs).
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
overall between within
Primary Completion Rate
Levels 73.218 28.387 24.779 13.523 3173
∆ 0.983 5.550 2.410 5.381 2593
Primary Drop-out Rate
Levels 34.407 23.193 20.299 12.592 2302
∆ -0.599 5.476 2.772 5.284 1724
Enrollment Rare Primary
Levels (Gross) 94.742 27.174 22.645 15.309 4941
∆ (Gross) 0.700 4.652 1.319 4.526 4449
Levels (Net) 79.619 19.785 17.966 9.494 2554
∆ (Net) 0.656 2.651 1.600 2.454 2014
Enrollment Rare Secondary
Levels (Gross) 51.938 31.583 29.577 14.874 4180
∆ (Gross) 1.109 2.990 1.366 2.840 3587
Levels (Net) 53.194 27.473 26.394 11.153 1382
∆ (Net) 0.944 2.844 1.861 2.597 1005
Duration of Primary
Levels 5.643 0.981 0.931 0.319 7052
∆ 0.002 0.152 0.016 0.152 6888
Democracy 0.407 0.491 0.383 0.327 4492
Log (GDP. Per cap) 7.253 1.450 1.411 0.300 5501
Urban Population (%) 45.727 24.264 23.450 6.378 6868
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Table 3.5: Estimation Results for Secondary Education: Effect of Changes in Duration of Primary
Education.
Enrollment Rate Enrollment Rate
Secondary (Gross) Secondary (Net)
Linear FE GMM Linear FE GMM
yt−1δ -0.016** -0.009*** -0.040* -0.015***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.020) (0.001)
∆ Duration of Primary -1.716** -3.440*** -3.487** -4.449***
(0.763) (0.044) (1.621) (0.042)
∆Log(GDP )t 4.670*** 10.413*** 1.862 2.657***
(1.244) (0.100) (1.821) (0.013)
∆ Democracy -0.071 0.095 -3.708 -5.064***
(0.226) (0.074) (3.608) (0.074)
∆ Urban population (%) 0.199 5.694*** 0.074 0.535***
(0.247) (0.178) (0.410) (0.048)
Constant 1.657*** -1.193*** 2.900** 1.417***
(0.338) (0.082) (1.132) (0.058)
Sample size 2517 2517.00 685 685.00
Number of Countries 122 122.00 92 92.00
R2 Adj. 0.0322 0.0830
F-stat 5.049 3.581
Hansen Test (stat.) 117.71 85.41
Test AR(1) (z-stat.) -5.25 -1.69
Test AR(2) (z-stat.) -0.17 -1.38
Notes: The outcomes variables are in first differences. This table reports the results
using linear panel fixed-effect and the GMM. All specifications include country-fixed
effect. Standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%,
* Significant at 10%.
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